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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
No. 88-0251 
Priority 14a 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Invoking three "fundamental rule[s] of statutory 
construction", i.e., (1) that a "statute should be construed as 
a comprehensive whole" (2) in "accord with usually accepted 
meanings" and (3) under the assumption "that each term in the 
statute [is] used advisedly" (Brief of Respondent/Defendant at 
6-7; hereafter cited as "Resp. Br." (quoting Utah County v. 
Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985))), the Utah State Tax 
Commission asserts that Amax's opening brief (hereafter "Pet. 
Br.") misconstrues the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-3 (1953 & Supp. 1986). l According to the Commission, 
Amax's property is "appurtenant" to the Great Salt Lake within 
1/ Both parties agree that since the tax year in question is 
1986, the statutes in effect as of January 1, 1986 are 
controlling for purposes of this appeal. Pet. Br. at 1, 
n.l; Resp. Br. at 1, n.l. Unless otherwise indicated all 
citations hereafter to sections of the Utah Code are to 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 & Supp 1986). 
-1-
the meaning of § 59-5-3 because — even though Amax's property 
"cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term [is] ordinarily 
understood in real estate)" (Resp. Br. 8) — the statutory term 
"appurtenant" should mean "adjacent." Id. The Commission 
further declares that the legislative classification of Amax's 
property as "centrally assessed" is sufficient justification — 
in and of itself — to withhold from Amax the benefit of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5. Notwithstanding a constitutionally 
mandated "uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible 
property in the state" (Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)), the 
Commission submits that Amax may be denied the 2 0% discount 
embodied in § 59-5-4.5 because "the legislature has plenary 
power in making such distinctions." Resp. Br. 23. These 
startling submissions simply do not withstand scrutiny. 
As an initial matter, the three "fundamental rule[s] of 
statutory construction" raised by the Commission (Resp. Br. 6-
7) are carefully applied in Amax's opening brief.2 The 
Commission, by contrast, strains these rules to the breaking 
point in the course of reaching a predetermined interpretation 
of § 59-5-3. Far from relying upon the commonly accepted 
meaning of the terms in § 59-5-3, the Commission shuffles 
through various alleged synonyms for "appurtenant" to support 
the submission that "appurtenant" should not be construed as it 
2/ Compare, for example, the Commission's statement of its 
three rules with the discussions appearing in Amax's 
opening brief at pages 28 (particularly footnote 29), 18, 
and 32, respectively. 
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is "ordinarily understood in real estate." Resp. Br. 8. 
Moreover, rather than construing the statute as a comprehensive 
whole and giving meaning to all terms used in the statute, the 
Commission's construction of "appurtenant" renders most of the 
language in § 59-5-3 superfluous. These arguments are — in a 
literal sense — unprecedented. Indeed, notwithstanding the 
extensive briefing that has taken place in this matter, the 
Commission has been unable to cite even one authoritative 
source — other than its own assertions and the arguments of 
co-counsel — to sustain its construction of § 59-5-3. 
The Commission's presentation regarding the 
constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax is equally 
unpersuasive. The Commission essentially takes the position 
that neither the Commission nor this Court has the power to 
examine the constitutionality of a statutory classification 
that denies Amax a 20% discount simply because Amax is 
centrally rather than locally assessed. This argument, 
however, ignores the factual record in this case which clearly 
demonstrates that Amax's property was assessed using the 
identical schedules and methods applied to locally assessed 
property. This unabashed discrimination based solely upon a 
formal legislative classification does not pass constitutional 
muster. Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 193 
(Utah 1984) ("Certainly the Legislature may not establish 
formal classifications of property that result in nonuniform or 
disproportionate tax burdens.") The Commission's position, 
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moreover, would preclude judicial review of virtually any 
formal classification established by the legislature, thereby 
effectively emasculating the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution requiring all tangible property to be assessed at 
"a uniform and equal rate." Utah Const, art XIII, § 3(1). 
Finally, the Commission's arguments are incompatible with 
the recent decision of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah in Union Pacific R. R. v. State Tax Comm'n of 
Utah, No. C-82-0998J (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) (copy attached as 
Appendix A). The Union Pacific court found that the 
Commission's refusal to apply § 59-5-4.5 to the real and 
personal property of three centrally assessed railroads was 
discriminatory under the provisions of the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 'MR 
Act"), Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (1976) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982)). Accordingly, the court 
enjoined the Commission from refusing to apply § 59-5-4.5 to 
the real and personal property of centrally assessed railroads. 
Union Pacific, slip op. at 58. As a result, Amax's centrally 
assessed real and personal property was not only assessed at a 
different rate than locally assessed real property, but at a 
different rate than that ordered by the Union Pacific court for 
the real and personal property of all centrally assessed 
railroads. Even assuming arguendo that there is some 
constitutional basis for discrimination between the classes of 
centrally assessed and locally assessed property (see Resp. Br. 
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19), there is no constitutional basis for such discrimination 
within the class of centrally assessed taxpayers. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AMAX'S PROPERTY IS NOT SUBJECT TO CENTRAL 
ASSESSMENT UNDER § 59-5-3 
There are three alternative conditions provided by § 59-5-3 
under which Amax's property may be centrally assessed. Amax's 
Plant and Ponds are subject to central assessment if they are: 
(1) located "upon" a mine or mining claim, (2) "appurtenant" to 
a mine or mining claim, (3) or used exclusively to process ores 
from a mine or mining claim owned by Amax and thereby "deemed 
appurtenant" thereto. Pet. Br. 15. The Commission concedes 
that the mine or mining claim at issue is the Great Salt Lake, 
which it admits is owned by the State of Utah, and that Amax's 
property is not "upon" this mine (lake).3 The present dispute 
regarding the construction of § 59-5-3, therefore, reduces to 
whether Amax's property is "appurtenant" or can be "deemed 
appurtenant" to a mine owned by Amax. It is neither. 
A. Amax's Property Is Not "Appurtenant" To A Mine 
Although the Commission's discussion of appurtenance begins 
with the premise that § 59-5-3's terms should be interpreted 
3/ In connection with its discussion of its "Second Rule," 
the Commission clarifies the ambiguity inherent in its 
decision as to whether the mine or mining claim to which 
the Plant is allegedly "appurtenant" is the Great Salt 
Lake or the Ponds. "In this case, the 'mine' is the water 
of the Great Salt Lake." Resp. Br. 10. Given this 
resolution, the Commission agrees with Amax that the Plant 
and Ponds are not "upon" the Great Salt Lake and that this 
statutory alternative is not at issue in this appeal. Id. 
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"in accord with usually accepted meanings" (Resp. Br. 7), the 
Commission's subsequent analysis yields precisely the opposite 
conclusion — namely, that the statutory term "appurtenant" 
must be read as having the unusual meaning of "adjacent." 
Indeed, the Commission concedes that the property involved here 
"cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term [is] ordinarily 
understood in real estate)." Resp. Br. 8. The only logical 
conclusion to be drawn from the Commission's statement of the 
"ordinary" meaning of "appurtenant" is that Amax's property is 
not appurtenant to a mine. But, since this logical conclusion 
renders Amax's property subject to local assessment, the 
Commission is forced to argue that the term "appurtenant" must 
mean something other than is "ordinarily understood in real 
estate." Resp. Br. 8. 
To concoct a definition of "appurtenant" different from 
that "ordinarily understood" (Resp. Br. 8), the Commission 
engages in a semantic shell game. The Commission, first, turns 
to various definitions of "appurtenant" and picks out the term 
"adjunct." Resp. Br. 10. The Commission, next, flips to the 
definition of "adjunct" and picks out the terms "added or 
joined." Id. Then, without hesitation, the Commission 
announces that "'added or joined' can mean sustantially [sic] 
the same thing as 'adjacent,'" a conclusion so "obvious" that 
no authoritative support other than the Commission's bald 
statement is apparently required. Id. Finally, with a grand 
verbal flourish, the Commission asserts that the legislature 
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"should be understood to mean 'adjunct' or 'adjacent'" when it 
used "appurtenant" in drafting § 59-5-3. Id. But, 
notwithstanding the Commission's creative formatting of 
definitions and juxtapositioning of "adjacent" and "adjunct," 
the only place in which the term "adjacent" is even mentioned — 
let alone used as a synonym for the term "appurtenant"4 — is in 
the unsupported declarations of the Commission's own counsel.5 
Amax would be delighted if this Court were to afford similar 
deference to the opinions of its counsel. 
4/ The block quote from Black's Law Dictionary appearing on 
page 10 of Respondent's Brief is presumably the result of 
unintentional, typographical formatting errors. A careful 
review of the definitions cited discloses that, rather 
than being a single quote, the indented material actually 
consists of two separate quotes interspersed with the 
Commission's own commentary. Indeed, the last sentence of 
the indented material, which is the only authority cited 
by the Commission for the proposition that the term 
"adjacent" is a "synonym" for the term "appurtenant," is 
the commentary of counsel for the Commission and not a 
quotation from Black's Law Dictionary or any other 
dictionary. 
5/ Apart from its kaleidoscopic rush through various 
dictionaries, the only authority the Commission musters to 
support its assertion that the legislature did not intend 
"to exempt mining property on the Great Salt Lake from 
central assessment" (Resp. Br. 8), other than selected 
excerpts from the closing argument of co-counsel before the 
Commission, jLd. 8-9, is its citation to Crystal Lime & 
Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 Utah 314, 209 P.2d 739 (1949). 
As indicated by the very passage quoted by the Commission 
from Crystal Lime, however, the issue involved in that case 
was the assessment of the surface of non-metalliferous 
mining claims with no mention of the location of these 
claims with respect to the Great Salt Lake. The decision 
simply has nothing to do with the legislature's intent with 
respect to the assessment of "mining property" adjacent to, 
but concededly not "upon," the surface of the Great Salt 
Lake (the mine). 
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The Commission's assertion that "appurtenant" means 
"adjacent" is bereft of case law support. In fact, with a 
single exception,6 the only cases cited by the Commission are 
the cases previously cited by Amax. Resp. Br. 11. The 
Commission, therefore, attempts to distinguish Amax's cases on 
the grounds that they deal with the appurtenance of incorporeal 
to corporeal property and fail to deal with a factual situation 
in which corporeal property has been found to be appurtenant to 
other corporeal property. This purported distinction, however, 
misses the entire point of the cases cited by Amax: namely, 
that land can never be appurtenant to land regardless of its 
physical proximity — particularly where the two properties are 
separately owned. E.g., Harris v. Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 
25, 53 (1836); In re Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx, 
6/ The only independent case cited by the Commission for its 
novel interpretation of "appurtenant" is the 1919 decision 
of the New York Supreme Court in Brown v. Lehigh Valley R. 
R^ ., 177 N.Y.S. 618, 621 (App. Div. 1919). A careful 
reading of this case, however, discloses that the 
definition quoted by the Brown court from the Century 
Dictionary not only fails to use the term "adjacent," but 
the term "adjacent" does not appear anywhere in the case! 
Indeed, each of the 30-odd definitions cited by the Brown 
court are entirely consistent with the definitions and 
cases cited by Amax for the proposition that the term 
"appurtenant" does not mean "adjacent." Moreover, the 
issue presented to the Brown court for decision was 
whether the cab of a locomotive was "appurtenant" to the 
boiler of the locomotive within the meaning of the federal 
Safety Appliance or Boiler Inspection Acts. Id. at 619. 
Thus, even if Brown did contain some statement in dicta 
somehow equating the term "appurtenant" with the term 
"adjacent," which it does not, Brown is clearly not 
controlling with respect to the Utah Legislature's usage 
of this term in § 59-5-3. 
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Citv of New York, 243 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1930); Kingsway 
Realty & Mortgage Corp. v. Kingsway Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S. 
265 (App. Div. 1928) ; Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 
S.W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).7 However desperately the 
Commission wishes it were otherwise, there is simply no legal 
support for the novel proposition that real and personal 
property can be "appurtenant" to other property simply because 
it is "adjacent" thereto.8 
7/ The Commission's discussion is particularly inapposite 
with respect to its purported distinction between the 
present case and Balcar, 193 S.W. 1094, relied upon by 
Amax. Citing one of the tests enunciated by the Balcar 
court, i.e., that for two properties to be appurtenant one 
must be "absolutely essential and necessary to" the 
operation of the other, id. at 1095, the Commission 
presents the circular argument that Amax's property "is 
essential in the operation of the process of the mine 
[Great Salt Lake, because] [w]ithout the Plant and Pond 
AMAX could not reduce the brine concentrate to magnesium." 
Resp. Br. 13. Such an assertion, however, falls far short 
of establishing that either the Plant or the lake are 
"essential" to the operation of the other. The self-
evident fact that Amax has used the Plant and Ponds to 
produce magnesium does not mean that Amax's property is 
essential to the operation of the Great Salt Lake. 
Several other companies extract and process minerals from 
the lake on a non-exclusive basis and presumably will 
continue to do so totally independent of the existence or 
continued operation of the Amax property. Nor is the lake 
essential to the operation of the Plant. As noted in 
Amax's opening brief (at 6-7 & n.5), the Plant could have 
been built anywhere there was low-cost energy, with 
minerals shipped in from any appropriate source. 
8/ Even if there were any merit to the Commission's 
unconvincing attempt to distinguish the cases cited in 
Amax's brief, one would suppose that — at some point in 
the extensive briefing which has occurred before both the 
Commission and this Court — the Commission would have 
been able to cite at least one authority, excepting of 
course the authority of its own statements and those of 
its co-counsel, for the proposition that "appurtenant" 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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B. Amax's Property Cannot Be "Deemed Appurtenant" 
To A Mine Owned by Amax 
The Commission's final submission regarding § 59-5-3 is 
that, even if the Plant and Ponds are not "appurtenant" to the 
Great Salt Lake, they must be "deemed" to be appurtenant to the 
lake. Resp. Br. 13-16. This point is presented in connection 
with the Commission's "Third Rule," i.e.. that "[t]he wording 
of § 59-5-3 should be read according to its literal wording, 
unless it would be unreasonably confused or inoperable." Resp. 
Br. 13. The Commission's ensuing discussion, however, not only 
ignores this rule but also contradicts the Commission's "First 
Rule" that all terms in the statute must be given effect. 
Moreover, the Commission's argument ignores its own historical 
interpretation of § 59-5-3 in other contexts and as applied to 
Amax's property for the 1987 tax year. 
The Commission's entire argument on this point is based 
upon a grammatical parsing of the last sentence of § 59-5-3. 
That sentence provides (emphasis added): 
For the purposes of taxation, all mills, 
reduction works, and smelters used exclusively for 
the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a 
mine or mining claim by the owner thereof shall be 
deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining 
claim though the same is not upon such mine or 
mining claim. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
really means "adjacent" and that the legislature really 
intended to convey the meaning of "adjacent" even though 
it chose to use "appurtenant" in § 59-5-3 and other 
statutes. See Pet. Br. 26-27. 
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Essentially, the Commission argues that the phrase "by the 
owner thereof" modifies the phrase "mills, reduction works, and 
smelters" rather than the phrase "mine or mining claim." This 
construction would, however, result in all owners of "mills, 
reduction works, and smelters" who reduce or smelt ores from 
any "mine or mining claim" being subject to central assessment 
— whether or not the owners also own the mine or mining claim 
from which the ores are extracted. The argument is clever, but 
it misses its mark by a mile, 
Amax agrees that the Commission has correctly deduced that 
the phrase "mills, reduction works and smelters" is the subject 
of the restrictive clause "exclusively for the purpose of 
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by 
the owner thereof." Unfortunately for the Commission, however, 
it has asked the wrong question. The interpretive issue 
presented here is not, as the Commission would have it, "What 
is the subject of the restrictive clause?", but rather, "What 
is the object of the preposition 'thereof in the restrictive 
clause?" Notwithstanding the normal rules of grammar, which 
encourage placing a preposition as close as possible to its 
object with no intervening noun, the Commission would have the 
Court find that the object of "thereof" is the subject of the 
sentence ("mills, reduction works, and smelters"), rather than 
the immediately preceding terms "mine or mining claim." 
This strained grammatical construction produces the 
anomalous result that, whenever the owner of any mill uses it 
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to process ores from "a mine/' the mill is subject to central 
assessment. And, since the owner of a mill — by definition — 
must use it to process the ores from some ''mine,'7 the 
Commission's argument would render all mills, reduction works 
and smelters subject to central assessment. As a result, the 
earlier terms of the statute, which provide for central 
assessment of property "upon" or "appurtenant" to a mine, 
become mere surplusage — in contravention of the Commission's 
First Rule. Had the legislature really intended that all 
mills, reduction works and smelters be subject to central 
assessment, it could have stated so directly, as it did in the 
same statute with respect to all mines and mining claims. 
Finally, all parties agree that the Commission has 
historically interpreted the last sentence of § 59-5-3 as not 
9/ The fact that the legislature did not intend by 
indirection to reach a result it could have achieved 
directly is further demonstrated by the last clause of 
§ 59-5-3: "shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine 
or mining claim though the same is not upon such mine or 
mining claim." Although the antecedent of "the same" is 
the subject of the sentence, namely "mills, reductions 
works, and smelters," the legislature's careful use of the 
words "such mine or mining claim," rather than the phrase 
"a mine" as used by the Commission in its brief, must be 
given some effect. The only reading of the entire statute 
which gives effect to all of its terms is the one 
suggested by Amax, namely, that a mill used exclusively by 
the owner of a mine to process ores from that mine will be 
deemed to be appurtenant to that mine even though it is 
not upon or actually appurtenant to that mine. Amax's 
construction is further supported by the legislature's 
rewording of the the language at issue here, effective 
January 1, 1988, to substitute the term "that mine" for 
the term "such mine." Utah Code. Ann. § 59-2-201(d) 
(Supp. 1988). 
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being applicable to the Geneva steel mill, although it is 
clearly used by its owner exclusively to process iron ore from 
"a mine" not owned by Geneva. In contrast, the statute has 
been consistently applied by the Commission to Kennecott's 
copper refinery, which is used exclusively to process copper 
and other ores from the Bingham Canyon mine owned by Kennecott. 
Tr. at 268. And, with respect to the 1987 tax year, when 
Kaiser was the exclusive supplier of all brines processed by 
Amax from the same Great Salt Lake "mine" owned by the state, 
the Division of Property Taxation, acting on behalf of the 
Commission, conceded that the Plant and Ponds should be locally 
assessed. Tr. at 146. The Commission's last minute, 
disingenuous reconstruction of the last sentence of § 59-5-3 
should therefore be disregarded. 
Amax's interpretation of the terms "upon," "appurtenant," 
and "deemed appurtenant," as used in § 59-5-3, is the only 
construction which satisfies each of the three rules of 
statutory construction advocated — but ignored — by the 
Commission. Accordingly, this Court should find that § 59-5-3 
must be applied in a manner consistent with both its plain 
meaning and the Commission's historical interpretation. The 
Court should further implement these findings by holding that 
the Commission does not have authority under § 59-5-3 to assess 
the tangible real and personal property of Amax. 
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II. THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO EXTEND THE 2 0% DISCOUNT OF 
§ 59-5-4-5 TO AMAX'S PROPERTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Assuming that this Court accepts Amax's analysis of § 59-5-3 and 
agrees that Amax's property should have been locally assessed, 
both the Commission and Tooele County have historically applied 
the 20% discount provided by § 59-5-4.5 only to locally 
assessed real property. Id.; Union Pacific, slip op. at 52-53, 
& n.49. This is erroneous, inasmuch as the express wording of 
the statute applies to all "taxable property." Since both real 
and tangible personal property are subject to ad valorem 
taxation, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-6(1), 59-5-7, there is 
no statutory basis for the Commission or the county assessors 
to apply the 20% reduction mandated by § 59-5-4.5 for all 
"taxable property" to real but not to personal property. 
Accordingly, even if this Court accepts Amax's position that 
its property must be locally assessed (and is therefore 
entitled to the benefit of § 59-5-4.5), the Court must still 
determine whether the Commission's refusal to apply the statute 
to Amax's personal and real property violates the express 
statutory language of § 59-5-4.5 as well as the constitutional 
mandate of "a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property." Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1). 
The Commission's submission regarding the constitutionality 
of § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax is essentially two-fold. 
First, the Commission suggests that neither it nor this Court 
can hold the statute unconstitutional as applied. Resp. Br. 20 
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(because § 59-5-4.5 does not in express terms apply to 
centrally assessed property, the Commission "does not have the 
authority" to consider the constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5 and 
neither the Commission nor the Court has the power "to extend 
the coverage of section 59-5-4.5 to centrally assessed 
properites [sic]"). Second, the Commission makes the 
straightforward — but untenable — assertion that § 59-5-4.5 
is constitutional simply because the legislature passed it. 
Resp. Br. 23 ("the legislature has plenary power in making such 
distinctions"). These conclusionary assertions, however, 
ignore the fundamental constitutional doctrine that each of the 
three separate branches of government was created to provide 
independent checks on the power of the others.10 
10/ Not only would the Commission have this Court defer to the 
legislature's "plenary power in making . . . distinctions 
. . . between centrally assessed and county assessed 
properties" (Resp. Br. 23), it would also have this Court 
defer to the Commission's interpretation of the taxing 
statutes it is charged to administer, including § 59-5-4.5 
Id. This argument, however, is blatantly disingenuous. 
Since the Commission has already admitted that it "does 
not have the authority to declare section 59-5-4.5 
unconstitutional" (Resp. Br. 20), how can it have arrived 
at an "interpretation" that this section is constitutional 
to which this Court must defer? In any event, with 
respect to issues of law — particularly those relating to 
constitutional questions — this Court has consistently 
ruled that it is not bound by the constitutional 
pronouncements of administrative agencies or lower 
judicial tribunals, nor does it give blind obeisance to 
legislative "distinctions." Hurley v. Board of Review, 98 
Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (Utah, 1988); Utah Dep't of Admin. 
Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah 
1983) : 
In reviewing the Commission's 
interpretations of general questions of law, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The Commission claims that, because of the inherent 
institutional limitations of administrative bodies, it lacks the 
power to pass upon the constitutionality or to extend the 
benefits of § 59-5-4.5 to Amax. Resp. Br. 20. Although the 
Commission does not assert in so many words that this Court is 
similarly fettered,11 it attempts to reach the same result with 
the bald assertion ''that the judiciary does not supplant the 
legislature when passing upon the constitutional validity of 
statutes." Resp. Br. 21. In short, the Commission suggests that 
this Court (like the Commission) is institutionally incapable of 
remedying any possible constitutional defect in the operation of 
§ 59-5-4.5. The only authority cited for this novel limitation 
upon the judicial power is a statement by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court acknowledging that its procedural rules can not "be 
interpreted to have directly repealed" certain Wyoming statutes. 
Resp. Br. 21 (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290 
(Wyo. 1980)). 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
this Court applies a correction-of-error 
standard, with no deference to the expertise 
of the Commission. General questions of law 
include interpretation of the United States 
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution and 
the Acts of the Legislature. 
Utah Dep't at Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 608; Allen v. 
Rampton. 23 Utah 2d 336, 34J5, 463 P.2d 7, 13 (Utah 1969). 
11/ The Commission, in fact, somewhat begrudgingly 
acknowledges that this Court "could declare section 
59-5-4.5 unconstitutional." Resp. Br. 20. 
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As indicated by the very passage quoted by the Commission, 
however, McGuire has absolutely nothing to do with the powers 
expressly delegated to this Court to directly consider the 
constitutionality of challenged legislative distinctions. Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 2.12 Indeed, this Court acknowledged in Rio 
Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, at 194 (Utah 1984) 
that "[t]he overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII [of 
the Utah Constitution] is to achieve uniformity in the ad valorem 
taxing scheme." As the authorities cited in Amax's opening brief 
(at 43-44) unanimously conclude, the only way that this 
"overarching purpose" can be fulfilled is the extension of 
§ 59-5-4.5 to all taxpayers from whom it has been 
unconstitutionally withheld. Amax is one such taxpayer. 
The Commission's second argument — that any and all 
classifications made by § 59-5-4.5 pass constitutional muster 
simply because the legislature made them — is even more flawed 
than the preceding submission. As is more fully discussed in 
Amax's opening brief, this Court's decision in Rio Alqom, which 
12/ Even the most cursory reading of McGuire discloses that 
the issue presented involved the appropriate procedures to 
be followed by County Commissioners in considering an 
application filed under certain Wyoming statutes for the 
creation of a private road. The excerpt from McGuire 
quoted by the Commission was merely the Wyoming Supreme 
Court's confirmation of the fundamental principle that, 
where the legislature has created a separate 
administrative body with its own statutory procedural 
requirements, these procedural requirements may not be 
"repealed" by the judicial rules of appellate procedure 
applicable to review of lower court proceedings. McGuire, 
608 P.2d at 1290. 
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upheld the facial validity of § 59-5-3, was premised upon the 
legislature's assumption that centrally assessed properties are 
appraised using different methods which produce lower values than 
the methods applied to locally assessed properties. The 
Commission, however, does not dispute the fact that, in this 
case, the record clearly establishes that this legislative 
assumption is unfounded and that Amax's property was assessed 
under the identical schedules and methodologies applied by county 
assessors. The Commission's only response is that the 
legislature is free to make whatever assumptions it chooses with 
respect to the treatment of centrally and locally assessed 
taxpayers, and that this Court should not thereafter inquire into 
the validity of those underlying assumptions. Resp. Br. 19-23. 
The Commission also asserts that once legislative classes are 
created, both the Commission and this Court must turn their backs 
upon any discriminatory treatment between the classes, so long as 
all taxpayers within the classes are similarly discriminated 
against. Resp. Br. 19 ("AMAX, as a centrally assessed property 
owner, is treated uniformly and equally with all other centrally 
assessed property owners"). 
The foregoing submissions, of course, are patently erroneous. 
Amax will not burden this Court with a repetition of the analysis 
refuting the Commission's strained arguments. See Pet. Br. 3 3-
42. Suffice it to note that the Court itself has recognized that 
"[c]ertainly the Legislature may not establish formal 
classifications of property that result in nonuniform or 
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disproportionate tax burdens.7' Rio Alaom, 681 P. 2d at 193. 
There is nothing to support the constitutionality of the 
Commission's refusal to apply § 59-5-4.5 in assessing Amax's 
property other than the arid classification of Amax's property as 
"centrally assessed." When such a formal classification results 
in "nonuniform or disproportionate tax burdens" (Rio Alaom, 681 
P.2d at 193), it cannot survive scrutiny under Article XIII, 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, even assuming the legal correctness of the 
Commission's argument (i.e. , that the constitutionality of 
§ 59-5-3 must be upheld so long as Amax is treated the same as 
other centrally assessed taxpayers), the Commission's underlying 
assumption — that all centrally assessed taxpayers are similarly 
treated — is no longer factually accurate. As previously noted, 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah has 
recently ruled that the 20% discount provided by § 59-5-4.5 for 
locally assessed real property must be extended to all 
property — both real and personal — owned by centrally 
assessed railroads operating within the State of Utah. Union 
Pacific, slip op.13 
13/ All of the parties in Union Pacific agreed "that the 
proper approach for valuing a railroad for taxation 
purposes is the so-called unitary approach" under which 
"the state determines the value of the entire railroad as 
a unit." Xd. at 8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the 
order of the Union Pacific court adjusting "assessed 
values" necessarily applied to the value of the entire 
railroads, as allocated to Utah, including all their real 
and personal property. 
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In Union Pacific, three centrally assessed railroads brought 
actions in federal court alleging that the Commission's refusal 
during the 1984 and 1985 tax years to extend to their property 
the same 20% discount applied to locally assessed commercial and 
industrial property constituted discriminatory treatment within 
the meaning of the 4R Act. The operative section of this act 
makes it unlawful for a state to assess railroad 
transportation property at a value which bears a higher 
ratio to the true market value of such transportation 
property than the ratio which the assessed value of all 
other commercial and industrial property in the same 
assessment jurisdiction bears to the true market value 
of all such other commercial and industrial property. 
Union Pacific, slip op. at 3. 
Because the actions were brought under the 4R Act, the 
Union Pacific court was not required to address the 
constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5.1U The Commission, however, 
relied upon the statute's asserted constitutionality, as well 
as this Court's decision in Rio Algom, to support its authority 
to centrally assess the railroads and to deny their properties 
the 20% discount extended to locally assessed real property. 
The Union Pacific court, therefore, was faced with essentially 
the same arguments presented by the Commission here. The 
14/ Nevertheless, the district court expressed serious doubt 
regarding the constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5. The court 
pointedly discussed the legislative history outlined in 
Rio Alcfom and found that "[t]he evidence in this case 
makes the legislature's assumptions [concerning the 
differences in valuation of state-assessed and locally 
assessed properties] suspect." Union Pacific, slip op. at 
54-55, n.52. 
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district court concluded that they lacked merit• Indeed, the 
court found that 
it is clear that the state of Utah has discriminated 
against the plaintiff railroads in its tax assessments 
of the plaintiffs for the years 1984 and 1985 in that it 
has assessed them at a higher rate than it assessed all 
other commercial and industrial property within the 
state for the same period. 
Union Pacific, slip op. at 58. Accordingly, the Union Pacific 
court ordered the Commission to assess the railroads at a ratio 
which took into account the 20% statutory discount extended to 
locally assessed real property and enjoined the Commission from 
collecting property taxes for the 1984 and 1985 tax years at a 
higher ratio. Icl. at 59. 
The effect of the Union Pacific decision is that, as of 
January 1, 1986, the tax lien date for Amax's property in the 
present case, the 20% discount of § 59-5-4.5 extended not only 
to the class of locally assessed real property but also to all 
real and personal property of railroads included within the 
class of centrally assessed taxpayers. Thus, irrespective of 
whether the Commission, or this Court, agrees with the Union 
Pacific court's interpretation of the 4R Act, the effect of 
that decision in creating a new class of taxpayers within the 
class of centrally assessed taxpayers cannot be ignored. 
As noted in Amax's opening brief, the Utah Legislature has 
repeatedly postponed the statutory deadline in § 59-5-4.5(2) 
requiring the Commission to "develop and implement sales and 
cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable property." Id.; Pet. 
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Br, 45, n.43. These methods are intended to remove nontaxable, 
intangible values from assessment.15 Until these methods are 
developed and implemented for all "taxable property," the 
impermissible discrimination between centrally and locally 
assessed taxpayers, and even between locally assessed real and 
personal property, embodied in the Commission's interpretation 
of § 59-5-4.5 will continue. Pet. Br. 45, n.43.16 The 
uncontroverted record in this case clearly demonstrates the 
fallacy of the assumptions which lent the only aura of 
justification to the Commission's limited application of 
§ 59-5-4.5 solely to locally assessed real property. See 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 131, 214 
(1985) (noting that, despite the reasoning in Rio Alqom, 
§ 59-5-4.5 "arguably is unconstitutional"). Moreover, as a 
result of the Union Pacific decision, this Court cannot ignore 
the fact that even all centrally assessed taxpayers are no 
longer similarly discriminated against. Accordingly, this 
Court must not allow the legislature and the Commission to 
continue to evade the clear requirements of the Utah and United 
States Constitutions. Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 2d at 345, 463 
P.2d at 13 (1969) ("we cannot shirk our duty to say that an act 
15/ See Pet. Br. at 46-47 for a discussion of the 
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the 
assessment of property taxes on intangible property. 
16/ The Utah Legislature is again sitting. Amax's counsel has 
been informed that the "temporary" 20% tax break for 
locally assessed properties will once again be extended 
for another year. See Pet. Br. 45, n. 43. 
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of the legislature is unconstitutional when it clearly appears 
to us that it conflicts with some provision of the state 
Constitution"). 
CONCLUSION 
The final decision of the Commission should be reversed. 
The Court should direct that Amax's property is properly 
assessable by Tooele County rather than by the Commission and, 
accordingly, that § 59-5-4.5 controls the determination of the 
"reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's real and personal 
property. In the alternative, the Court should direct the 
Commission to calculate the "reasonable fair cash value" of 
Amax's real and personal property pursuant to the formula set 
out in § 59-5-4.5. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 1989. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
/H/jillkfiuMl' 
Mark K. Buchl (#0475) 
David K. Detton (#0874) 
Richard G. Wilkins (#4950) 
50 South Main, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
(801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Appendix A 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants, 
and 
SALT LAKE COJNTY, et al., 
Defendants in 
Intervention. 
SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
Case Nos. 
C-84-0839J 
C-84-0840J 
consolidated under 
Case No. C-82-0998J 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
VS. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants, 
and 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al., 
Defendants in 
Intervention. 
The plaintiff railroads—Union Pacific (UP), the Denver & 
Rio Grande Western (D&RG) and Southern Pacific (SP)—brought 
these consolidated actions to challenge their ad valorem property 
tax assessments for 1984 and 1985 on the grounds that the 
assessments discriminated against them in violation of section 
306 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 
1976 (the 4R Act), Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 
(1976). The cases were tried to the court beginning on February 
9, 1988, and ending on March 17, 1988, with some brief respites 
in between. The court heard closing arguments on March 30, 1988. 
Robert A. Peterson and Eric C. Olson represented the plaintiffs 
UP and D&RG. L. Ridd Larson and William A. Marshall represented 
plaintiff SP. Rex E. Madsen, Reed L. Martineau and Maxwell A. 
Miller represented the defendants, and Bill Thomas Peters 
represented the defendants in intervention, some twenty Utah 
counties.1 There were 788 exhibits, some of great complexity. 
After digesting the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the 
court now enters this memorandum opinion and order, which, under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), shall constitute the 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
1
 The intervening counties are Box Elder, Cache, Carbon, 
Davis, Emery, Grand, Iron, Juab, Millard, Morgan, Piute, Salt 
Lake, Sanpete, Sevier, Summit, Tooele, Utah, Wasatch, Washington 
and Weber. 
2 
I. 
THE STATUTE 
In 1976, in part to "restore the financial stability of the 
railway system of the United States,11 Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 
101(a), 90 Stat. 31, 33 (1976), Congress passed the 4R Act. 
Section 306 of the act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503, prohibits 
states and local taxing authorities from discriminating against 
railroad property. That section makes it unlawful for a state to 
assess railroad 
transportation property at a value which bears a higher 
ratio to the true market value of such transportation 
property than the ratio which the assessed value of all 
other commercial and industrial property in the same 
assessment jurisdiction bears to the true market value 
of all such other commercial and industrial property. 
Id. § 306(1)(a), 90 Stat, at 54.2 A railroad that thinks it has 
been treated unfairly may bring an action in federal district 
court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. § 306(2). The 
court is then required to compare two ratios: the ratio of the 
assessed value of rail transportation property to its true 
market value, and the ratio of the assessed value of all other 
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment 
jurisdiction to its true market value. The court may grant 
2
 The wording and structure of section 306 were changed 
when the section was recodified as part of the revised Interstate 
Commerce Act. See Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 
11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445-46. Because the recodification was 
not meant to change the substantive law, see id. § 3(a), 92 Stat, 
at 1466, this court will use the original language of section 306 
for convenience and clarity. 
3 
relief to the railroad only if the ratio of assessed value to 
true market value for rail transportation property "exceeds by at 
least 5 per centum the ratio of assessed value to true market 
value, with respect to all other commercial and industrial 
property in the same assessment jurisdiction" (in this case, the 
state of Utah). Id. § 306(2)(c).3 
The plaintiff railroads claimed that Utah had discriminated 
against them in two ways: by overvaluing their property and by 
denying them a twenty-percent discount in their assessed value 
that was available to locally assessed commercial and industrial 
real property under Utah law, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (Supp. 
1986). Plaintiff SP settled its valuation claim with the state 
before trial. At the trial, the parties presented the court with 
x 1.05 
3
 The court1s analysis can be expressed by a simple 
equation: 
Assessed value of Assessed value of 
rail transportation all other commercial 
property ? and industrial property 
> 
True market value of True market value of 
rail transportation all other commercial 
property and industrial property 
At the time of the assessments at issue in this case, Utah 
law required that all taxable property in the state not 
specifically exempt from taxation be assessed "at 20% of its 
reasonable fair cash value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 
1985); see also infra note 6 ("reasonable fair cash value" is 
synonymous with "true market value"). Thus, the ratio for both 
rail transportation property and all other commercial and 
industrial property for the years in question should be .20. 
In 1985 the statute was amended to make the assessed value 
the same as "reasonable fair cash value." However, the statute 
did not take effect until January 1, 1986. See 1985 Utah Laws 
ch. 165, § 64. 
4 
a stipulation setting forth two alternatives for the ratio of 
assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and 
industrial property in Utah—one ratio if the court upholds the 
twenty-percent discount statute and another if the court strikes 
down the twenty-percent discount statute.4 Because the 
railroads' assessed value is given, see infra note 48 and 
accompanying text, the only issues for the court to decide are 
the true market value of the UP and D&RG as of the assessment 
dates (January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1985) and the allegedly 
discriminatory effect of the twenty-percent discount statute. 
The court will consider these issues in order. 
II. 
THE PLAINTIFFS' VALUATION CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs UP and D&RG claim that Utah has discriminated 
against them by overvaluing their rail transportation property 
for the assessment years 1984 and 1985.5 To determine whether 
4
 In other words, the parties have stipulated to the right 
half of the equation set forth in footnote 3, supra. Which 
stipulated value the court will ultimately apply depends on the 
court's holding on the plaintiffs1 claim of de jure 
discrimination under the equalization aspect of this case. See 
infra part III. 
5
 Originally UP took the position that it was foreclosed 
from challenging the statefs• valuation of its property by the 
Tenth Circuitfs decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Company 
v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 467 U.S. 
1230 (1984). See Union Pac. R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 635 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1063 (D. Utah 1986). However, the Supreme Court 
opened the door for UP to assert its valuation claims in this 
case by its decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. 
5 
that is so, the court must determine the plaintiffs1 true market 
value and then compare that figure to the state's assessed 
value, which was based on the state's determination of the 
plaintiffs' true market value.6 Under Utah law, the plaintiffs' 
assessed value for assessment years 1984 and 1985 should be .20 
of their true market value. See supra note 3. If it is greater, 
then the state has overvalued the railroads, regardless of any 
equalization claim they may have. 
The court's task is complicated by the fact that the 
defendants concede that the plaintiffs' initial assessed values 
for 1984 and 1985 were not based on their true market value. In 
May 1984 the state assessed UP based on a true market value of 
$3,875,000,000. On June 4, 1984, the state issued a revised 
assessment for UP based on a true market value of $3,600,000,000. 
The state has since become convinced that the methods it used to 
arrive at those figures were wrong and has abandoned those 
appraisals. See Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 341, 345-46, 
350-51. For trial the state relies on a new appraisal for UP 
Oklahoma Tax Commission. 107 S. Ct. 1855 (1987). Ironically, SP, 
which had asserted that Lennen did not preclude it from 
challenging the state's valuation, see 635 F. Supp. at 1065-66, 
is no longer asserting a valuation claim, it having settled its 
valuation dispute with the state. 
6
 Utah law requires that taxable property within the state 
be assessed on the basis of its "reasonable fair cash value." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1; see also supra note 3. "Reasonable 
fair cash value" is equivalent to "market value." Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938, 
939-40 (1952). For simplicity, unless otherwise indicated the 
court shall use the terms "value" and "true market value" to 
refer to both "reasonable fair cash value" and "true market 
value." 
6 
based on a different approach, which places the value of UP for 
assessment year 1984 at $3,700,000,000. The state followed a 
similar approach for UP for assessment year 1985 and for the D&RG 
for 1984 and 1985, with similar results.7 Thus, the defendants 
concede that the plaintiffs were assessed at rates that were not 
based on their true market value for assessment years 1984 and 
1985• To determine how much the plaintiffs1 newly determined 
values differ from their "true market value," if at all, the 
court must still determine their true market value as of January 
1, 1984, and January 1, 1985. 
In deciding the valuation question, the court has the 
advantage of expert help. The plaintiffs have presented the 
appraisals of their expert witness, Dr. Arthur Schoenwald, a 
financial consultant specializing in railroad and utility rate-
making and valuation. See common exhibits 30 & 33, 36 & 39. The* 
defendants rely on the newly prepared appraisals of Mr. Ekhardt 
Prawitt, the utility and railroad valuation manager for the 
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. See 
common exhibits 32, 35, 38 & 41. However, to bolster Mr. 
Prawittfs appraisals, the defendants also offered appraisals 
7
 The statefs original assessment for UP for assessment 
year 1985 was based on a true market value of $4 billion. In 
this proceeding, the state relies on a new appraisal, which 
places the value of UP for 1985 at $3.4 billion. 
The state initially valued the D&RG based on a true market 
value of $370 million for assessment year 1984. In June 1984 it 
revised its valuation based on a value of $340 million. In this 
proceeding it relies on a new appraisal placing the true market 
value of the D&RG at $320 million. Similarly, it initially 
valued the D&RG for 1985 at $375 million and now relies on a new 
appraisal placing the true market value at $320 million. 
7 
prepared jointly by Mr. Michael Goodwin, an independent appraiser 
specializing in the valuation of public utilities, railroads and 
other multistate corporations, and Dr. James Ifflander, an 
assistant professor of finance at Arizona State University. See 
common exhibits 31, 34, 37 & 40. The plaintiffs and intervenors 
also offered the testimony of various experts retained to 
critique or comment on the competing appraisals. 
Unfortunately, all these expert opinions may only verify 
George Bernard Shawfs observation that, lf[i]f all economists were 
laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion." The 
operative word here is f,aff; for, after listening to seventeen 
full days' of expert testimony spread over six weeks, the court 
suffers from no lack of conclusions. The problem is that the 
proffered expert conclusions differ from one another by over a 
billion dollars in the case of UP and by a like order of 
magnitude in the case of the D&RG.8 Fortunately, the parties do 
agree on some things. To that extent, the court can begin on 
common ground. 
The parties agree, for example, that the proper approach for 
valuing a railroad for taxation purposes is the so-called unitary 
approach. Under that approach, the state determines the value of 
the entire railroad as a unit, even though its assets may be 
located in several states, and then allocates a portion of that 
total value to the taxing state (in this case, Utah) based on 
8
 The results of the various appraisals are summarized in 
appendix A. 
8 
such factors as the percentage of the railroadfs total trackage 
that runs through the taxing state. The parties also agree on 
the percentage of the total value of each railroad1s property 
that should be allocated to Utah. See infra note 47 and 
accompanying text; Tr. at 13-14. Finally, the parties agree in 
principle on the three standard methods for valuing a railroad: 
the cost approach, the income approach and the stock and debt 
approach. It is in applying the three standard approaches to 
reach a conclusion as to true market value that the parties part 
ways. 
A. Overview of Valuation Approaches 
At the risk of oversimplification,9 the court can summarize 
the three basic approaches as follows. 
The Cost Approach. The cost approach values a railroad 
based on historical costs—that is, how much it actually cost to 
produce the assets initially. From historical cost is deducted 
accumulated depreciation to get net book value. Then, from net 
book value an amount is deducted to reflect obsolescence. The 
final figure is the cost indicator of value. All the parties 
9
 Cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search 
for Intermediate Premises. 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991 (1967) ("It 
is, of course, one of the risks of subjecting complex 
controversies to judicial determination that the rules evolved 
compel arbitrary simplification"). 
9 
agree that the cost indicator is the least accurate indicator of 
true market value.10 
The Stock and Debt Approach. The stock and debt approach is 
a substitute market approach. Because of the infrequent sales of 
railroad properties, the absence of an organized market for such 
properties and the lack of accurate, current information about 
sales of railroad properties as such, appraisers must look to a 
substitute source for accurate information. There is an 
organized market for the purchase and sale of fractional 
ownership interests in railroad properties; shares or ownership 
interests in debt, bonds and such are bought and sold with some 
regularity. A specialist in dealing with such shares on an 
organized exchange "makes a market" for them. He offers to buy. 
He offers to sell. He can thus respond to offers to buy and 
sell. An appraiser uses such market information as some 
indication of value. 
Those who use such data assume that the "market" has depth 
as of a particular moment in time and that multiplying the market 
value of the fractional share by the number of outstanding shares 
will produce a figure equal to the whole market value, which, 
when added to outstanding debt, will produce an approximation of 
true market value of company assets subject to ad valorem 
taxation. The argument is that the whole is equal to the sum of 
1 0
 Although he calculates a cost indicator of value, Dr. 
Schoenwald gives it no weight in determining the final value of 
the railroads. The other appraisers give it some weight but less 
than they give the other indicators of value. 
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its parts, a conservative position, one could argue, in today's 
era of leveraged buyouts. It does not factor in the element of 
control or the break-up value frequently perceived by some to be 
hidden in the assets of a target company. 
Often the outstanding shares of a railroad are held in their 
entirety by a holding company. The organized market to which an 
appraiser looks for data is in the shares of the holding 
company—not in the shares of the railroad. Thus, the data to 
which the appraiser looks for an indication of value is two steps 
removed from the actual assets appraised. The appraiser must 
determine in some appropriate fashion what fraction of the market 
value attributed to the shares of the holding company is 
represented by the holding company's ownership, through its 
railroad subsidiary, of railroad assets. 
In applying the stock-and-debt approach, there is relatively 
little disagreement among the parties as to the value of the 
plaintiff companies' debt. See, e.g.f Tr. at 1243. The main 
disagreement is over the companies' equity value and specifically 
over how to determine what portion of the holding company's gross 
equity is attributable to railroad property. 
The state of Utah uses basically two approaches for 
attributing a portion of the holding company's equity to the 
railroad. Both use various multipliers. In the first approach, 
the state compares the subject railroad to other railroads in the 
industry. It calculates an industry multiplier based on the 
ratio of various railroads' stock prices to their cash flows and 
11 
earnings. It then applies those price/cash flow and 
price/earnings ratios or multipliers to the subject railroad's 
cash flow and earnings to get estimates of the value of the 
railroad's stock. In its second approach, the state compares the 
subject railroad to its holding company. The state calculates 
multipliers based on the ratio of the railroad's net profit, 
revenues, income and assets to the holding company's net profit, 
revenues, income and assets and applies the multipliers to the 
company's total equity value to determine the equity value of the 
railroad. See, e.g.. common ex. 32 at S/2. 
On the other hand, Dr. Schoenwald, the railroads' expert, 
calculates the equity value of each of the nonrail assets of the 
holding company and deducts those values from the holding 
company's total equity value. What's left over, he concludes, is 
the equity value of the railroad. 
The Income Approach. The theory behird the income approach 
is that anyone who buys a railroad buys it only for the income 
the railroad will generate. The basic principle is that the 
present value of a company is equal to the value of all future 
benefits to be derived from ownership of the company, discounted 
to their present value (expressed in dollars). Since the future 
benefits to be derived from ownership of a company are simply the 
income one can expect to receive from the company, the income 
approach tries to project the income from the railroad's 
operations over a period of time and then places a present value 
12 
on that income.11 The present value of future income is 
expressed by the following formula: 
II I2 m 
V0 = + T + • • • + 
(1 + i) 1 (1 + i) 2 (1 + i) n 
where V0 is the value at time zero, Ii is the income for year 1, 
and i is an interest rate or discount rate. 
Obviously, this basic valuation formula is almost impossible 
to apply accurately because one can't know precisely the value of 
all the variables. It is impossible to predict accurately the 
income for each future year for the life of the railroad, to 
know how long the railroad will continue to produce income and 
to predict the appropriate interest rate for future years. Thus, 
each of the appraisers in this case simplifies the basic formula 
based on certain assumptions. 
All the experts essentially agree on at least one 
simplification of the basic formula, namely, 
V0 = , 
k-g 
where CFx represents the net cash flow in period 1, k represents 
the cost of capital, and g represents the growth rate. See 
1 1
 The court uses the term "income" loosely. More 
precisely, what the appraiser tries to value is net cash flow, 
which Dr. Schoenwald defined as net operating income plus 
depreciation and deferred income taxes (where applicable) less 
capital expenditures. See pltffs1 ex. 73. Because capital 
expenditures for railroads in recent years have generally 
exceeded depreciation and deferred taxes, Dr. Schoenwald has used 
net railroad operating income (NROI)—which he characterizes as a 
"generous" measure of net cash flows—as his income stream to 
capitalize. 
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pltffs' ex. 358 (Dr. Schoenwald); Tr. at 1088 (Dr. Ifflander) & 
1455 (Dr. Pettit).12 
This approach to income valuation, which tries to estimate 
future cash flows over a period of time and discount them to 
their present value, is called yield capitalization or a 
"discounted cash flow" (DCF) model and is widely used (in one 
form or another) by appraisers and financial analysts to value 
income-producing property. See, e.g., Tr. at 1348-49 (testimony 
of Dr. Ifflander), 1491 (testimony of Dr. Pettit), 1728 
(testimony of Mr. Van Drimmelen, a real estate appraiser), 2077 
(testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald).13 
12
 All of the experts also basically agree on another 
variation of the basic model, the dividend model. See, e.g., 
pltffs' ex. 54; Tr. at 1088-89. The dividend model uses 
dividends paid out in year 1 as the income to be capitalized and 
is expressed by the following equation: 
Di 
V0 -
k-g 
where D]^  is the dividends at year 1 and g is the growth rate. 
The basic formula was also sometimes recast to include another 
variable, b, which represents the percentage of the firm's 
earnings that it retains to reinvest: 
Ei(l-b) 
v0 
k-g 
where E^ is the earnings in period 1. See Tr. at 1455; 
intervenors1 ex. 6. 
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 Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander used (or misused, from the 
plaintiffs1 perspective) a standard yield capitalization or DCF 
model for their appraisal of UP for 1984, in which they 
projected the railroadfs cash flows for the next five years, 
discounted them to present value and added a terminal value, 
representing the present value of all the cash flows after the 
five-year period. See common ex. 31 at 76-102. For all of the 
14 
The standard simplifications of the basic formula used in a 
yield capitalization model assume that k, g and b (the retention 
rate, see supra note 12) are constant and are all equally 
influenced by inflation. They also assume that the growth rate, 
g, is equal to b times r, the marginal rate of return on new 
investment. See Tr. at 1455. 
The plaintiffs1 appraiser, Dr. Schoenwald, on the other 
hand, starts from the basic formula but makes a different 
assumption, namely, that r (the rate of return on new investment) 
equals k (the cost of capital). Using this assumption, he 
simplifies the basic formula to 
NCFx 
V0 -
k 
where NCFi is the net cash flow for year l.14 In essence, he has 
eliminated growth from the equation. He is able to do this 
because, given his assumption that r equals k, any growth in the 
company's future earnings is merely expansion growth and not real 
growth; thus, according to the witness, it does not add anything 
years in question, they also use a direct capitalization method, 
similar to the state1s. See infra pp. 16-17. 
14
 Dr. Schoenwald further assumes that net railroad 
operating income (NROI) is a generous estimate of net cash flow, 
see supra note 11, so he substitutes NROI for NCF in the 
equation. For his projected net railroad operating income for 
year 1 he uses an average of the railroadfs NROI for the five 
previous years. 
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to present value.1D Hence, Dr. Ifflander has called Dr. 
Schoenwald's income valuation model an expansion model, a term 
the court will use at times to distinguish it from the standard 
yield capitalization model. Although Dr. Schoenwald's model is 
in theory a yield capitalization model, it proceeds from a very 
different assumption than the standard yield capitalization 
models described by the other experts.16 
The state uses another method to value the railroads based 
on their projected income, called direct capitalization. In the 
direct capitalization method, the appraiser determines a 
company's value by multiplying its accounting earnings by a 
price/earnings ratio or by dividing the earnings by the 
1 5
 According to Dr. Schoenwald, a company may grow through 
new, additional investment, but if the returns on new investment 
are not greater than the cost of capital—that is, if the cost of 
the growth offsets any gain from the new investment—then there 
is no actual or net growth. Net growth occurs when the company 
earns more than the cost of its additional capital, and only net 
growth—as opposed to gross or expansion growth—increases net 
present value. A company that only earns its cost of capital may 
grow, and that growth may make the company worth more five years 
down the road, but that future growth adds nothing to the 
company's value today because it will cost the company as much as 
it will add to its value in the future. See Tr. at 33-39; 
pltffs' ex. 54. 
1 6
 The court has spared the reader the mathematical 
manipulations by which one gets from one formula to another. 
Suffice it to say that the various formulae appear to be 
mathematically correct and internally consistent if one accepts 
the underlying assumptions. It is a simple matter of applying 
mathematical principles to the basic formula. In making that 
application, however, one should bear in mind Robert Heilbroner's 
observation that "[m]athematics has given economics rigor; but 
alas, also mortis." The simplified formulae are no better than 
the basic formula and the experts' assumptions. 
16 
earnings/price ratio. The ratios are derived from stock market 
data for comparable companies. 
Under the statefs direct capitalization method, value at 
time zero (V0) is equal to earnings for time 1 (E^ divided by 
the earnings-price ratio (E/P), or, expressing the relationship 
algebraically, 
El 
V0 - • 
E/P 
Although not directly derived from the basic valuation 
formula,17 the direct capitalization method proceeds from the 
assumption that the price of a company's stock will represent the 
consensus of investors1 opinions about a companyfs future cash 
flows, cost of capital and growth prospects. In other words, it 
uses the stock market as the best evidence of willing buyers' and 
sellers' opinions of value, which presumably are based on their 
own yield capitalization analyses. 
For its earnings figure, the state uses a five-year weighted 
average of the railroad's net operating income, adjusted for 
inflation, in which income for more recent years is weighted 
more heavily than income for earlier years. 
Obviously, the two basic questions in applying the income 
approach are, How do you define the income stream to be 
1 7
 While recognizing that direct capitalization is not 
merely a variation of the yield capitalization model, by making 
certain assumptions, Dr. Ifflander showed how one might conclude 
that Dr. Schoenwald's expansion model also uses an 
earnings/price ratio for its capitalization rate (k). See Tr. at 
1107-09. 
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capitalized? and What capitalization rate do you use? Although 
the parties disagree somewhat about what constitutes the proper 
income stream to capitalize, their most fundamental disagreement 
is over the capitalization rate. As one can see from the basic 
valuation formulae, since the capitalization rate is a fraction 
that appears in the denominator, a small change in the 
capitalization rate can produce a big difference in computed 
value.18 
The plaintiffs argue that the state's capitalization rates, 
which vary from 8.28 to 11.98 percent, see appendix A, are 
clearly wrong since all the experts agreed that the driving force 
behind the capitalization rate, however expressed, namely, the 
cost of capital (debt and equity), was no less than 13 percent 
and closer to 15 percent during the relevant periods. See, e.g., 
interveners' exs. la through Id at 2. However, that argument 
overlooks the fundamental differences between yield 
capitalization and direct capitalization. The capitalization 
rate for yield capitalization is based directly on k, the cost of 
capital, and therefore should be on the order of 15 percent. The 
capitalization rate for direct capitalization, on the other hand, 
is based on price-earnings ratios taken from stock market data. 
It is not based directly on the cost of capital. Because there 
18
 For example, Dr. Schoenwald calculated an income 
indicator of value for UP for 1984 of $2,198,981,000, based on 
earnings of $338,643,000 and a capitalization rate of 15.4%. 
See common ex. 30 & 33 at 89. Lowering the capitalization rate 
just 1%, to 14.4%, increases the value of UP by almost 7%, to 
$2,351,687,500. 
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is no direct relationship between the cost of capital and P/E or 
E/P ratios, the fact that a direct cap rate or E/P ratio may be 
less than the cost of capital (k) is of no moment* Although 
there was wide disagreement among the experts about the price-
earnings ratios to be used and their importance in the process, 
the evidence suggested that the state values were well within the 
very broad range of possible ratios. Thus, the plaintiffs' 
argument has merit only if the state was required to use a yield 
capitalization method as opposed to a direct capitalization 
method in arriving at an approximation of value. 
B. Choice of Method 
The parties do not disagree so much over the proper 
application of each other's methodology as they do over the 
choice of method in the first place. 
Technically, methodology is not the issue in this case— 
discrimination is. But discrimination under the 4R Act must be 
measured in terms of "true market value"—the congressionally 
mandated measure—and one's conclusion as to true market value 
depends on the path one takes to reach the conclusion. 
One problem with subjecting complex issues like valuation to 
judicial determination is that the court generally must choose 
among the competing claims of experts. Unless the court performs 
19 
its own appraisal—a task it is not inclined to undertake19—the 
court must hold either for the plaintiff or the defendant, when 
often the truth—or at least a more exact picture of reality— 
lies somewhere in between. The court, of course, may adjust an 
expert's appraisal up or down based on other experts1 critiques 
of the appraisal,20 but the starting point for judicial 
determination is always one appraisal or another, and each 
appraisal is based on a particular methodology that, to a large 
extent, predetermines the result. Thus, implicit in the court's 
holding is a decision as to method. 
For example, if the court were to hold for the plaintiff and 
accept Dr. Schoenwald's valuations, it would in effect be saying 
that Dr. Schoenwald's methodology produces the correct result, 
and any methodology that produces a different result must be 
wrong. Given that hypothetical premise, it naturally follows 
that, if the state must tax the plaintiffs in proportion to their 
true market value, which it must under the 4R Act, then the state 
should apply Dr. Schoenwald's methodology in valuing the 
19
 Were the court to undertake its own, independent 
appraisal, its choice of methods would enjoy undue sanction, and 
the application of its methods would be subject to many of the 
same types of criticisms that the parties' appraisals are subject 
to but without the same opportunity the parties have had to 
critique each other's appraisals. 
2 0
 The court*s task is complicated by the fact that often, 
as here, the experts themselves cannot always agree whether the 
appraisals were properly performed or not. 
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railroads, since that is the only methodology that will 
consistently produce the right result.21 
Thus, although the plaintiffs argue that the court need not 
dictate to the state a particular methodology, some choice of 
methodology is inescapable. The courts decision on valuation 
must recognize (at least implicitly) one valuation method at the 
expense of other methods. That in no sense determines that one 
is right and the others are wrong. 
The defendants suggest that the court should simply defer to 
their current choice of methodology. However, the plaintiffs 
were initially assessed based on a methodology that even the 
state now concedes was flawed. The question, then, is whether 
the state's new appraisals, based on a new methodology, are 
entitled to the same deference. 
The plaintiffs argue that they are not.22 They argue that 
the court should determine the valuation question based on which 
method it finds the most reasonable. They further contend that 
Dr. Schoenwald's valuation method is more reasonable than the 
state's, best reflects reality and leads to the actual or correct 
true market value. 
2 1
 None of the experts in this case suggest that all roads 
lead to Rome. Rather, the testimony was that two different 
methods will produce the same result only by coincidence. As one 
can see from appendix A, the varying methods the three sets of 
appraisers used produced widely varying results. 
2 2
 The plaintiffs suggest that, if anything, the state 
should have the burden of proving the validity of its new 
appraisals. See infra note 29. 
21 
The evidence suggested that yield capitalization is 
generally preferred to direct capitalization because it is 
directly derived from basic value theory, is more sophisticated 
than direct capitalization and generally produces a better 
result. However, the evidence also showed that both approaches 
were widely used to value railroads and other properties. The 
question, then, is whether the state is free to choose among 
accepted valuation methods or whether the 4R Act compels the use 
of one particular method. 
In the Burlington Northern case the Supreme Court expressly 
left open the question "whether a railroad may, in an action 
under [the 4R Act], challenge in the district court the 
appropriateness of the accounting methods by which the State 
determined the railroadfs value, or is instead restricted to 
challenging the factual determinations to which the State's 
preferred accounting methods were applied.11 Burlington N. R.R. 
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. 107 S. Ct. 1855, 1861 n.5 (1987). 
Although the question may be an open one, this court has found 
nothing in the 4R Act itself or in its legislative history that 
requires this court to make the state apply a particular 
valuation methodology* 
Indeed, the legislative history of the 4R Act suggests just 
the opposite. The committee report on Senate Bill 927, one of 
several precursors to the 4R Act,23 stated that the bill 
23
 It is well settled that the legislative history of 
precursors to a statute are relevant in construing the statute. 
See Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Lennen. 573 F. Supp. 
22 
does not suggest or require a State to change its 
assessment standards, assessment practices, or the 
assessments themselves. It merely provides a single 
standard against which all affected assessments must be 
measured in order to determine their relationship to 
each other. It is not a standard for determining 
value; it is a standard to which values that have 
already been determined must be compared. 
S. Rep. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. app. B (1968), quoted in 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Lennen. 573 F. Supp. 
1155, 1161 (D. Kan. 1982) (emphasis omitted), aff'd. 715 F.2d 494 
(10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230-31 (1984).24 
In subsequent legislative proposals Congress reaffirmed its 
position that it did not intend to dictate state valuation 
methods. See Lennen, 573 F. Supp. at 1163-64. For example, in 
hearings on House Bill 16245, another forerunner of the 4R Act, 
Philip M. Lanier, a railroad representative, testified that the 
bill "would not deal with valuation being standard. The 
standards and methods of valuation that any State wishes to use 
would be totally unaffected by this legislation." Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 16245, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1970), quoted in 573 F. Supp. at 1163 
(emphasis omitted). Thus, the legislative history suggests that 
1155, 1160 n.5 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 494, 497 (10th 
Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 467 U.S. 1230-31 (1984), and cases 
cited therein. 
2 4
 The quoted passage from appendix B to Senate Report 1483 
appears to have been taken from the testimony of James N. Ogden, 
Vice-President and General Counsel of the Gulf Mobile and Ohio 
Railroad Company, during hearings on Senate Bill 927. See 
Burlington Northern, 573 F. Supp. at 1161-62. 
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the statute was not meant to dictate a statefs choice of 
methodology, at least as long as the methodology chosen had a 
rational basis and was not chosen for a discriminatory purpose,25 
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the statute itself 
requires this court to choose the correct valuation method from 
among the competing methods. They argue that the statute 
requires the court to determine their "true market value" and 
that the only way the court can do that is by determining which 
method gives the "true" true market value. That method is the 
one that is most reasonable and most accurate and hence arrives 
at the most correct result. They further argue that Dr. 
Schoenwald's methodology and data are the most reasonable and 
most accurate and can be applied most consistently and hence give 
the best indication of true market value. See Tr. at 1151-52. 
2 5
 To the extent Lennen concluded from the legislative 
his ;ory that the whole valuation question was essentially off 
limits to federal courts, see 573 F. Supp. at 1164 ("the issue of 
the appropriate 'true market value1 of a railroad is generally 
not to be an issue in a Section 306 case"), it has since been 
overruled. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commfnr 
107 S. Ct. 1855 (1987). However, this court agrees with Judge 
Rogers's conclusion "that Congress did not intend "for the federal 
courts to become involved in establishing . . . procedures for 
the states in the valuing of railroads." 573 F. Supp. at 1164. 
It is one thing to say that the 4R Act allows federal courts to 
review railroads1 claims of overvaluation. It is quite another 
to say that the Act dictates a state1s choice of valuation 
methods. The 4R Act may provide relief if a state overvalues a 
railroad by misapplying its chosen methodology or by using a 
methodology that has no rational basis or is chosen for the 
purpose of overvaluing railroads. See, e.g.. Burlington N., 107 
S. Ct. at 1859 (the railroad's only claim of discriminatory 
taxation was that the state had misapplied its own valuation 
methodology). But, this court believes, the Act does not 
necessarily provide relief just because the state's chosen 
methodology results in higher values than some other method the 
state could have chosen. 
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The court declines the plaintiffs1 invitation to adopt Dr. 
Schoenwald's methodology as the only correct methodology for 
determining true market value. 
Each expert asserts that his methodology results in a value 
that most closely corresponds to reality. However, absent a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, there is no absolute way to 
test the assertions of competing valuations or competing claims 
of correspondence to "true market value," if such a thing exists 
in the order of things. 
From the beginning of this case, the court was willing to 
assume that there was such a thing as "true market value" that 
could be determined objectively from evidence much the same way a 
court can determine a wrongfully discharged employee's back wages 
from evidence. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 635 
F. Supp. 1060, 1067 at n.10 (D. Utah 1986). Indeed, the 
approach of nhe 4R Act presupposes that, like Plato1s ideal, 
there is in fact a "true market value," that it exists, that it 
can be pointed to, pictured, recognized and can be used as the 
standard against which valuation figures may be compared. 
Success in valuation would be indicated by the correspondence of 
the valuation figures with the ideal. 
From the six weeks of testimony in this case, however, 
certain things became apparent. First, valuation is an art, not 
a science. It is a function of judgment, not of natural law. 
Try as it might, even Congress is incapable of enacting either a 
natural law of the market or Platofs ideal. "True market value," 
25 
then, must needs mean something else. Absent a miracle of time, 
place and circumstance—willing buyer, willing seller, high noon, 
January 1, 1984, for example—true market value for purposes of 
ad valorem taxation is always an estimate, always an expression 
of judgment, always a result built on a foundation of 
suppositions about knowledgeable and willing buyers and sellers 
endowed with money and desire, whose desires are said to converge 
in a dollar description of the asset. All of this is simply a 
sophisticated effort at "letfs pretend11 or "modeling," in modern 
jargon, and all of it involves judgment. Not natural law, not 
science—judgment. 
The appraisals in this case generally contain two or three 
estimates of value, which, within the same appraisal, may vary by 
as much as 100 percent or more. See, e.g., common ex. 30 & 3 at 
75 & 83; see also appendix A. Thus, the same appraiser may come 
to vastly different conclusions as to the value of the same 
railroad for the same assessment date, depending on the method he 
uses. Moreover, each method requires various estimates and 
calculations, small variations in any of which may lead to large 
differences in value. See, e.g.. supra note 18. Absent evidence 
of an actual sale, the term "true market value" is at best a 
rational fiction. Conclusions as to true market value are based 
on each appraisers best judgment, and each appraiser approaches 
the task of valuation a little differently, with his own 
assumptions and theories as to what mythical buyers and sellers 
consider (or should consider) in arriving at an agreed-on price. 
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Perhaps Clifford Fitzgerald, a corporate finance expert who 
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, said it best: "There is 
not one universal concept of value*" Tr. at 2096. Nor is there 
flany one perfectly correct method." Ifl. at 2110-11. See also 
id. at 1718 (testimony of Mr. Voytko that there is no standard 
approach to value). 
Mr. Goodwin described Dr. Schoenwald's methodology as 
"assumption driven." The epithet was apparently meant 
disparagingly and was contrasted with his own methods, which, he 
claimed, were "market driven." In truth, however, each 
appraiser's methodology is assumption driven.26 The assumption 
may be r equals k or that growth is constant, or the assumption 
may be that the price of a companyfs stock is the best indicator 
of the value of its assets. (Presumably that is what Mr. Goodwin 
meant when he said his model was "market driven.") The latter 
assumption, of course, may oversimplify matters by not.accounting 
for the effect of other variables on the stock market—economic 
and otherwise (perhaps even including the conference of the Super 
Bowl winner). See, e.g.. Tr. at 1337-39, 1421 (testimony of Dr. 
Ifflander that stock market prices do not always accurately 
reflect value); id. at 1507-10 (Dr. Pettit's attempt to explain 
2 6
 The court is reminded of the old story of the economist 
marooned with a companion on a desert island. A can of food 
washed up on the beach. The economists starving companion asked 
him how they could open the can, to which the economist blithely 
replied, "Assume a can opener." 
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the stock market crash of 1987 based on various factors unrelated 
to a company's true market value).27 
From all the evidence presented it is clear that there is 
more than one way to value a railroad. See, e.g., Tr. at 1718, 
2110-11. Each method may represent what some buyers and sellers 
actually do.28 All the methods may be equally rational given 
their underlying assumptions. And they are all irrational if 
pressed to extremes. For example, using the income approach, one 
would be forced to conclude that a company with a net loss for 
the year or over a period of years actually had a negative value 
— a skewed and discordant picture of reality. See, e.g.. Tr. at 
2201-03. Or, using the stock and debt approach, one might be 
forced to conclude that over 20 percent of the value of a company 
evaporated in the few short hours between the opening and closing 
of the New York Stock Exchange on October 19, 1987, despite the 
fact that the company's functioning assets remained virtually 
unchanged over that period. Each method or theory depends on 
certain assumptions that cannot ultimately be proved or disproved 
by reason alone nor replicated in experience. Thus, this court 
cannot say that any one method is necessarily more rational than 
2 7
 The vagaries of the stock market once prompted a member 
of the Council of Economic Advisors to suggest that market 
behavior could be explained not so much by market analysis but by 
psychoanalysis. 
2 8
 Indeed, perhaps the best evidence of the railroads' true 
market value is not any single appraisal but, assuming that each 
appraiser has performed his work accurately and in good faith, 
the average of all the appraisers1 judgments concerning true 
market value. 
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any other. Nor can the court say that one method alone arrives 
at the railroadfs "true market value." Rather, the evidence 
suggests that the term "true market value" "is a judgment not 
subject to mathematical precision that is based on a wide variety 
of factors" and f,is at best an approximation." Rio Alaom Corp. 
v, San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984). From all the 
evidence in this case, the court cannot say that the state's 
judgment as to the plaintiffs' true market value is wrong.29 
The state suggests that its methods have the advantage that 
they are used consistently to value all centrally assessed 
property, so if the method produces any error in valuations, the 
effect is not to discriminate against the railroad. Presumably, 
if application of the same method overvalues or undervalues all 
commercial and industrial property in the state equally, there is 
no discrimination against railroads. However, the state concedes 
^ In a 4R Act case "the burden of proof with respect to 
the determination of assessed value and true market value shall 
be that declared by the applicable State law." Pub. L. No. 94-
210, § 306(2)(d), 90 Stat, at 55 (1976). The plaintiffs argue 
that the burden of proof should be on the state to prove its 
assessment is correct. They cite the court to no authority for 
this proposition. Rather, they argue that, under Utah law, once 
it is shown that a state's assessment is wrong, the burden shifts 
to the state to prove that its new assessment is correct, and, 
they note, the state has already admitted its original 
assessments were wrong. But see Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comn^n. 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979) (if the taxpayer 
claims error in a proceeding before the tax commission, "it has 
an obligation, not only to show substantial error or impropriety 
in the assessment, but also to provide a sound evidentiary basis 
upon which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation") 
(citations omitted). Even assuming that the plaintiffs' argument 
is correct, given the court's decision that the state was free to 
adopt the method of its choice, the court concludes that the 
state has met the burden of proving the correctness of its new 
assessments by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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that it did not treat all centrally assessed property equally for 
the assessment years in question. For 1984 and 1985 it assessed 
all centrally assessed property using its discarded methodology. 
If one of the 350 centrally assessed property owners appealed, 
the state prepared a new assessment based on its new methodology, 
as it did in this case. Thus, the state did not treat all 
centrally assessed property equally in 1984 and 1985. 
Moreover, even if the state did treat all centrally assessed 
property equally (as it claims to do now), it may still have 
violated the 4R Act if its uniform method has the effect of 
overvaluing railroads. It is no defense under the 4R Act "to 
say that the state may also be discriminating against . . . other 
companies.ff Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Louisiana Tax 
Comm'n. 498 F. Supp. 418, 422 (M.D. La. 1980).30 
Nevertheless, the statefs argument may have some force. 
If the court were to require the state to use Dr. Schoenvaid's 
valuation methods, the state would have to apply the methods to 
3 0
 Although it may not be a defense to say that all 
centrally assessed properties are overvalued as a result of the 
state's choice of methodology, if in fact they are it is likely 
that together all the owners of centrally assessed property will 
have sufficient political power to force the state to change its 
valuation methods. After all, it is not every property owner 
that can achieve beneficial legislation such as the 4R Act. As 
Auberon Herbert once observed: "It is the small owner who offers 
the only really profitable and reliable material for taxation. 
. . . He is made for taxation. . . . [H]e has less skill, and 
ingenuity as regards escape; and he still has a large supply of 
'ignorant patience of taxation.1 If Quoted in F. Coffield, & 
Popular History of Taxationf quoted in A Dictionary of Legal 
Quotations 165 (S. James & C. Stebbings comp. 1987). The court, 
however, does not base its conclusions as to discrimination on 
the state's relative treatment of centrally assessed properties 
but on its conclusion as to the railroads' true market value. 
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all centrally assessed property so that the discriminatory effect 
of the statefs valuations could be properly measured. The court 
has found no evidence that Congress intended the 4R Act to 
dictate how a state must value nonrailroad property. If, as it 
appears from the record, all centrally assessed properties are 
now appraised using the methods the state used in its current 
appraisals of the plaintiff railroads, that may be reason to give 
those appraisals greater weight. 
But the court believes that it should not disturb the 
state's choice of methodology for other reasons as well. From 
the testimony of the state's witnesses, the court concludes that 
the state's appraisers sincerely seek to arrive at what they 
consider to be the railroads' true market value and that, to that 
end, they constantly reevaluate their methods and change them 
when they become convinced that they are wrong.31 The state's 
3 1
 Indeed, of all the appraisers in this case, the court 
was most impressed with the credibility of the state appraiser, 
Mr. Prawitt, and of his supervisor, Mr. Monson. Of all the 
appraisers, Mr. Prawitt seemed the only one who was not out to 
achieve a particular, predetermined result. Indeed, he testified 
that he prepared his appraisals without even looking at the 
state's earlier appraisals so that the earlier appraisals would 
not affect his conclusions. The other experts all had a theory 
to defend, which colored their choice of data and methods. Each 
appraisal required the appraisers to make numerous judgments, but 
the other appraisers often seemed to base their judgments on the 
end result, using a technique or methodology if it tended to 
support the desired result and changing it when convenient. For 
example, the plaintiffs criticized the state's witnesses for 
using average P/Es, arguing that a mechanical computation of 
averages ignored the factors that went into an informed judgment. 
See, e.g., Tr. at 1661-63. Yet they then turned around and 
argued that their true market value should be determined by 
mechanically computing the average of Dr. Schoenwald's income and 
stock and debt indicators of value (ignoring the cost indicator 
altogether), when the disparity between Dr. Schoenwald's income 
31 
witnesses also testified that appraisal methods and philosophy 
are continually changing, presumably for the better, and that 
they try to keep current on new developments in the field without 
regard for the source, that is, whether the developments be from 
other state appraisers or from industry experts. Were this court 
to conclude that the 4R Act codified the Schoenwald method of 
valuation, it would prevent states from critically examining 
their appraisal methods and would discourage them from adopting 
new and better methods as they become accepted by the appraisal 
profession. 
For all of these reasons, the court concludes that the 4R 
Act no more enacts the Schoenwald method of valuation than the 
fourteenth amendment enacts Herbert Spencerfs "Social Statics.ff 
Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
All parties must remember that the purpose of producing a 
figure as to value, whether we label it "fair cash value" or 
"true market value," is to provide a figure against which one may 
then apply the tax percentage to arrive at what is due and owing 
by the taxpayer to the taxing unit. If one has a choice of 
methods and chooses a method with a rational footing and is 
consistent and evenhanded in applying the method to all 
and stock-and-debt indicators was so great as to make one or the 
other suspect without even comparing Dr. Schoenwaldfs figures 
with the other appraisers1. See, e.g., Tr. at 1511. None of the 
appraisers may have been perfectly consistent, but Mr. Prawitt 
seemed most concerned with discovering an objective value and 
least committed to a particular theory or methodology. 
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comparable properties, then conceptually the end result should be 
payment by taxpayers of a tax bill that is not disproportionate 
to the like payments of all other comparable taxpayers* The 
court holds that, as long as the state's methodology has a 
rational basis and was not chosen for a discriminatory purpose, 
the court will not disturb that choice. The court concludes from 
all the evidence that the state's methodology has a rational 
basis and was not chosen with the intent of overvaluing 
railroads. Thus, it will not second-guess the state's choice of 
method. 
Even if the court were forced to choose among the competing 
methodologies, the court believes that the state's methodology 
has much to commend it. Not only does the state consistently 
use essentially the same approach for all centrally assessed 
property, but alr;o its approach is based on historical data and 
market data readr.ly available both to investors and to the 
state.32 Moreover, it is easy to apply—an important 
consideration given the state's limited resources and the 
tremendous time pressures under which the state's appraisals must 
be prepared. See, e.g.. Tr. at 339 & 402. For example, although 
a yield capitalization model is more elegant and might be 
preferred to a direct capitalization model, Mr. Fitzgerald, one 
32
 For example, unlike Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, who 
place much weight—possibly too much—on the company's 
projections for the coming year, gleaned in part from internal 
company documents not available to the public generally, the 
state uses the weighted average of the five previous years' 
income to determine the railroad's projected income in its income 
approach. 
33 
of the plaintiffs1 experts, testified that it took him two and 
one-half years, working full time, to value seven railroads, an 
average of over four months for each. See id. at 2068. The 
state simply does not have that luxury. Given its time 
constraints, it may legitimately choose an approach that is 
easier to apply than a more precise but more complex model. 
In many respects, the statefs methodology is closer to Dr. 
Schoenwald1s than is Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflanderfs. For 
example, both the state and Dr. Schoenwald use a five-year 
average of NROI as the basis for their income calculations, 
whereas Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander use projections based on 
strategic plans known more for their inspirational value than for 
their prediction value and on a form of regression analysis 
discredited by the plaintiffs' statistical expert. Both the 
state and Dr. Schoenwald use the full debt rate in determining 
the cost of debt, whereas Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander use what 
they call current yield. Both the state and Dr. Schoenwald treat 
current assets and current liabilities in their stock-and-debt 
approach; Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander do not. Both the state 
and Dr. Schoenwald allocate both debt and equity to the railroad. 
Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander allocate only equity. And in the 
cost approach both the state and Dr. Schoenwald purport to 
measure obsolescence based on the entire railroad industry; the 
other appraisers do not. See generally id. at 1898-1913 (Dr. 
Schoenwaldfs summary of the basic differences among the three 
approaches). 
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Even if the court were inclined to require the state to 
apply yield capitalization rather than direct capitalization, 
however, the court would not require it to apply the Schoenwald 
method of yield capitalization (that is, the expansion model). 
The Schoenwald method is based on a critical assumption, namely, 
that r equals k. The assumption is problematic at best. It was 
debated at length during the course of the trial. Needless to 
say, there was no consensus among the experts (who included 
several Ph.Ds in finance) about the reasonableness of the 
assumption. The experts vigorously disputed the issue, 
predictably aligning themselves according to the party on whose 
behalf they were called to testify.33 Without deciding the 
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 The opinions of some of the experts as to whether or not 
r is greater than k appeared to depend to some extent on their 
opinion about the prospects of the railroad industry. At times 
it seemed the experts were testifying about two different 
industries. In Dr. Schoenwaldfs view, the railroads have been in 
decline since at least the 1920s a:id can never expect to earn a 
rate of return even equal to the cost of capital. In fact, it is 
a wonder that they are still in business. On the other hand, in 
the opinion of Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander the Staggers Act, 
which was passed in 1980, ushered in a new Golden Age of 
railroading. 
Perhaps there is more than one railroad industry. At least 
the railroad industry of the late 1800s was a far different 
industry from the railroad industry of the mid-1900s. Thus, 
Chesterton could write: 
[W]hen I was a boy, which was just before the motor-car 
burst upon the world, I never dreamed of doubting that 
the railway-train dominated the whole future of the 
world. It was the latest great locomotive that man had 
invented. . . . To talk, as some people are now 
talking, of whether railways will become obsolete, or 
whether steam can be superseded, of whether railway 
stock will always be as safe as it was—all this would 
have been to me a prophecy as unintelligible as some of 
those Old Testament visions that seem a medley of 
wheels and wings and clouds. Railways had been firmly 
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reasonableness of the assumption, the court can at least say that 
the assumption would appear to be less than self-evident and not 
whole-heartedly accepted in the finance community, judging from 
the expert testimony. 
Dr. Schoenwald attempted to prove the validity of his 
assumption by showing that historically the railroads have failed 
to earn a return commensurate with the cost of capital. See 
pltffs* ex. 95(a). In exhibit 95(a) Dr. Schoenwald calculated a 
value for UP using his expansion model based on UPfs average NROI 
for the period 1950-54. Using his expansion model, he valued the 
railroad at $581,514,000. He then did a more traditional yield 
capitalization analysis for the period 1955-84, discounting the 
actual net cash flows for those years based on the actual 
discount rates and adding a terminal value based on the average 
NROI for the period 1980-84, and concluded that the actual total 
established before I was born; I never dreamed of 
doubting that they would remain exactly the same after 
I died. 
G.K. Chesterton, Come to Think of It . . . 16-17 (1931). Yet 
the railroads did change. Chesterton lived to see their economic 
power decline. Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander would have the 
court believe that if Chesterton had lived another fifty years he 
would have seen the rebirth of the railroad industry. The 
railroads1 experts, on the other hand, talk as though the 
railroads will never recover. But if they've changed once, they 
may change again. 
There was testimony that the railroad industry is a cyclical 
industry. According to Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, the 
industry has come full circle. Perhaps only time will tell 
whether or not they are right. In any event, the court does not 
have to choose between the competing prognostications. The 
market makes its own choice. And the state's valuation methods, 
based on the market as they are, should reflect the market's 
outlook. 
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market value of the railroad's net cash flows from 1955 into 
perpetuity was only $247,504,000. Thus, he concluded, his model 
actually overvalued UP by more than double, showing the r did not 
even equal k for UP over the last thirty years. 
Mister Goodwin and Doctors Ifflander and Pettit criticized 
Dr. Schoenwald for using actual, historical figures. They argued 
that the value of the railroad as of January 1, 1955, depended on 
what investors would have been willing to pay for it, which in 
turn would have depended on their expectations. They further 
argue that no one could have accurately predicted the actual 
numbers, which Dr. Schoenwald uses. Implicit in their argument 
is that investors are overly optimistic and would have projected 
much higher cash flows and lower discount rates than actually 
occurred. All Dr. Schoenwald tried to show was that, had the 
investors had perfect foresight and applied his model, they still 
would have overvalued the railroad. From this he concludes that 
his assumption that r equals k is a generous assumption. 
Nevertheless, it appears to the courtfs untrained eye that 
exhibit 95(a) is flawed. It suffers from one of those classic 
"mismatches" that Dr. Schoenwald is fond of talking about. Dr. 
Schoenwaldfs expansion value is based on a discounted average 
NROI, yet the yield capitalization approach he compares it to is 
based on discounted net cash flows. It is apparent from exhibit 
95(a) that NROI is substantially higher than net cash flows, 
especially for the early years of the study. For example, for 
the period 1955-59, the first five-year period for which 
37 
complete data are available, the average NROI is over four times 
greater than the average net cash flow. Of course, under Dr. 
Schoenwald1s expansion model, a higher NROI translates into a 
proportionately higher final value. Thus, by using NROI for the 
period 1950-54 to value the railroad, Dr. Schoenwald arrives at a 
higher value than he would have reached had he used net cash 
flows for the same period. In other words, Dr. Schoenwald 
concludes that his model overvalues the railroad based on a 
comparison of an expansion value derived from high NROIs to a 
yield capitalization value derived from relatively low net cash 
flows. 
Had Dr. Schoenwald compared values that were both based on 
net cash flows or both based on NROI, he may have reached very 
different results. For example, if one were to estimate the 
average net cash flow for the period 1950-54 by dividing NROI 
(Dr. Schoenwald1s capitalized income stream) by four, it would 
reduce his expansion value accordingly and might turn out that 
his model actually undervalued the railroad significantly. 
Unfortunately, exhibit 95(a) omits all the data the court needs 
to make the proper comparison. At best, however, the court 
concludes that exhibit 95(a) only supports Dr. Schoenwaldfs 
second assumption—that NROI is a generous estimate of net cash 
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flow34—and not his primary assumption, namely that r is no 
greater than k. 
Dr. Schoenwald also tried to prove his assumption that r is 
no greater than k by calculating expected growth rates and 
comparing them to the expected growth that the investment 
publication Value Line, the defendants1 Bible, projected for the 
same time period. Using the basic formula that growth (g) equals 
retained earnings (b) times the rate of return (r) and using the 
ICC's cost of capital for the rate of return (based on his 
assumption that r equals k), Dr. Schoenwald concluded that not 
even Value Line expected the railroads to grow at even an 
expansionary growth rate. See Tr. at 2059-64; 2117-19; pltffs1 
exs. 464 & 465. However, Dr. Ifflander testified that the 
calculated growth rate (b X r) showed growth in earnings, and if 
one used return on equity (ROE) for r and compared the calculated 
growth rate with Value Line's projected growth rate for earnings, 
the railroads as a whole were projected to grow at a rate faster 
34
 In fact, exhibit 95(a) casts doubt on Dr. Schoenwald's 
second assumption as well. Dr. Schoenwald justified his use of 
NROI as opposed to net cash flow on the grounds that NROI is a 
"generous." estimate of net cash flow. However, at least for the 
years from 1980 to 1984, the years that Dr. Schoenwald averaged 
for his 1985 income estimate, net cash flow was greater than NROI 
for UP, despite a negative net cash flow for 1980. 
39 
than Dr. Schoenwaldfs expansionary model allows for.35 See Tr. 
at 2230-32; defs1 ex. 236. 
Rather than assuming that r equals k, the state lets the 
market decide the values of r and k. Implicit in the market 
price of a security are the market participants1 determinations 
of the alphabet soup of economic variables for the company—r, k, 
g and b. It appears that at least some investors believed that r 
would be greater than k for the plaintiff railroads during the 
assessment years. See, e.g., Tr. at 1504-06; interveners' ex. 8. 
Philip Anschutz bought the D&RG (or, more precisely, its holding 
company, Rio Grande Industries) in 1984, one of the assessment 
years, and in fact paid a premium for the company's stock,36 
suggesting that he viewed the railroad as a good investment that 
could return a rate greater than the cost of capital.37 
3 5
 Even Dr. Ifflander conceded that, no matter how one 
compares projections with implied growth rates, the D&RG was not 
expected to achieve even expansionary growth for 1984. So the 
assumption that r is no greater than k may have been true for the 
D&RG for 1984. 
3 6
 The plaintiffs suggest that the stock market may not be 
the best indicator of a railroadfs value. Given that Dr. 
Schoenwald's stock-and-debt approach consistently valued the 
plaintiffs higher than his income approach and that Mr. Anschutz 
was willing to pay a premium over the company's stock market 
price, the plaintiffs may be right. The stock market may 
undervalue railroads. 
3 7
 The plaintiffs point out that both Union Pacific and 
Southern Pacific also had the opportunity to buy the D&RG but 
turned it down. Of course, the fact that some investors or 
potential buyers may see the value of a company differently than 
others does not necessarily mean that there is no market for the 
company or that it is overvalued. In fact, differences of 
opinion as to value are what make for a market in the first 
place. 
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Assuming for the moment that Dr. Schoenwald's conclusion as 
to historical facts is correct, that does not necessarily mean 
that his model correctly values the railroad. Looking at 
history, the willing seller may conclude that r is no greater 
than k. Indeed, that may be why he wants to sell—because he 
cannot earn even his cost of capital. Nevertheless, regardless 
of past performance, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to 
suggest that in valuing a prospective investment willing buyers 
assume that they will not be able to earn a return at least equal 
to their cost of capital. Otherwise, one would think that they 
would look elsewhere to invest their money. Since the elusive 
true market value depends on both a willing buyer and a willing 
seller, the assumption that r is no greater than k may at best be 
half true, and, as Justice Frankfurter used to observe, a half-
truth is often a whole lie. See P. Elman, Response, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1949, 1952 (1987). 
The court does not have to decide the reasonableness of the 
assumption, however, because the Schoenwald valuation method 
suffers from a more serious defect. There is no evidence that 
those in the business of valuing railroads for buyers and sellers 
actually use Dr. Schoenwald's expansion model.38 For example, 
38
 Mr. Fitzgerald of First Boston Corporation testified 
that in his yield capitalization method he uses a method similar 
to Dr. Schoenwald's to arrive at a terminal value, that is, a 
value for the cash flows after the last year of his analysis. 
However, his basic analysis is the traditional yield 
capitalization approach, similar to Messieurs Goodwin and 
Ifflander's, by which he forecasts future cash flows for a period 
of time—in his case, over a ten-year period. The terminal value 
in such an approach is only a small fraction of the total value. 
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when the board of directors of Rio Grande Industries (the 
holding company for D&RG) was deciding whether to accept Mr. 
Anschutz's offer to buy the company, it did not ask Dr. 
Schoenwald to value the railroad. Rather, it commissioned a 
study by the investment firm of Morgan Stanley, and Morgan 
Stanley did not value the railroad using Dr. Schoenwaldfs 
expansion model. See Tr. at 1241; defs' ex. 155. Its study used 
a discounted cash flow model similar to the method Messieurs 
Goodwin and Ifflander used in the 1984 appraisal of UP and also, 
as a check, applied various price multiples in a fashion similar 
to the state's appraisal and, incidentally, with results closer 
to the state's appraisal than to Dr. Schoenwald's.39 
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the state's methods 
are used by other professional appraisers and by market analysts. 
See, e.g.. Tr. at 1682 (testimony of Mr. Voytko that P/E ratios 
are widely used by security analysts). Dr. Schoenwald himself 
used price-earnings multiples to value the nonrailroad 
subsidiaries of the railroad holding companies in his stock-and-
3 9
 Morgan Stanley concluded that the railroad's equity 
value was roughly $280 million. See defs' ex. 155 at ex. 1, p. 
1. When the debt value is added to the equity value, the value 
becomes approximately $360 million, see Tr. at 1176, compared to 
the state's estimated value of about $389 million for the 
railroad's stock and debt. See common ex. 41 at S-l. To the 
stock and debt value must be added another $6 million or so for 
operating leases to arrive at a total stock and debt indicator of 
value. In comparison, Dr. Schoenwald's total value for the 
railroad for the same assessment year was less than $280 million. 
42 
debt approach.40 The statefs direct capitalization approach may 
not be the preferred approach of the more sophisticated analysts, 
but at least analysts generally use price-earnings multiples as a 
check on their yield capitalization results. Moreover, the ICC 
used a direct capitalization method in analyzing the offers of 
competing railroads1 to buy the core lines of the Milwaukee 
Railroad and concluded that, of the three methods it used to 
evaluate the offers, "the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is a more 
reliable basis to make an evaluation, since it is less 
susceptible to outside influences or to speculative 
considerations." Defs' ex. 17 at 54; see also Tr. at 560-63. 
The ICC also used a direct capitalization approach when it 
decided the question of compensation for the trackage rights the 
D&RG was awarded as a result of the Union Pacific—Missouri 
Pacific merger. See defs1 ex. 18 at 4. Perhaps most telling, 
the D&RG itself argued that the interest rental portion of the 
compensation should be calculated using a price-earnings 
multiple, id. at 7, and UP agreed, i£. at 8. Thus, the 
plaintiffs themselves have used a form of direct capitalization 
to determine value. 
The plaintiffs argue that the state's appraisals are flawed 
4 0
 If the use of price-earnings multiples in fact 
overvalues properties, as Dr. Schoenwald suggested in critiquing 
the appraisals of Messieurs Goodwin, Ifflander and Prawitt, then 
Dr. Schoenwald overvalued the holding companies1 nonrailroad 
subsidiaries, and, under his stock-and-debt methodology, any 
overvaluation of the nonrailroad subsidiaries attributable to Dr. 
Schoenwald's use of price-earnings ratios would produce a 
commensurate undervaluation of the railroad. See infra pp. 44-
45. 
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because the state looks to the stock market for both its income 
and its stock and debt approaches. Because both approaches 
depend on the same source, they argue, they cannot produce 
independent and hence accurate results. Dr. Schoenwald's income 
approach has an advantage over the statefs, they suggest, in that 
it does not depend on market data for its conclusions. Thus, it 
provides an independent indicator to compare to the stock-and-
debt indicator of value and is therefore the better method. 
Of course, nothing in the 4R Act requires a state to use 
three separate and independent indicators of value. Dr. 
Schoenwald himself uses at most only two indicators of value. 
See supra note 10.41 The fact that the state looks to the stock 
market for the data for two of its approaches does not mean that 
its appraisals are flawed. Rather, it merely reflects the 
state's underlying assumption, namely, that the stock market is 
the best indicator of a company's value. Given all the 
evidence, the court cannot say that that assumption is any less 
reasonable than Dr. Schoenwaldfs—namely, that r equals k.42 
Consequently, the court believes that the state's income 
indicator of value is a proper estimate of true market value. 
While the choice between the parties1 income approaches may 
present a choice between equally reasonable alternatives, the 
4 1
 In fact, for his 1985 appraisal of D&RG, Dr. Schoenwald 
used only one indicator. See appendix A, p. 67 n.2. 
42
 The state's assumption was even supported by one of the 
plaintiffs' own witnesses. See Tr. at 1717 (testimony of James 
Voytko). 
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court believes that the defendants1 stock-and-debt approach is 
more reasonable than Dr. Schoenwald's and arrives at a more 
accurate indicator of value. Dr. Schoenwald assumes that the 
value of the railroad is whatever is left over after valuing the 
other components of the holding company. While that assumption 
is theoretically sound, as the state1s experts pointed out, it 
makes the railroad bear the burden of any measurement errors. A 
number of small errors valuing the other properties would create 
a large error in the value of the railroad. For example, Dr. 
Ifflander suggested that Dr. Schoenwald may have overvalued 
Champlin Petroleum, a subsidiary of Union Pacific Corporation, 
the holding company, by as much as a billion dollars. Using the 
Schoenwald method, that error alone would translate into a 
billion dollar error in the railroad's value. The plaintiffs1 
own witness, Mr. Fitzgerald, called Dr. Schoenwald's stock-and-
debt method "a discredited activity which I place very little 
judgment on," Tr. at 2104, one which could result in "a cascade 
of capricious error" in the railroad's value, id. at 2106. The 
court believes that the state's allocation method arrives at a 
more accurate figure by allocating not only the stock price but 
also the risk of error. 
In short, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not 
shown that Dr. Schoenwald's methodology produces a better 
result. There is thus no reason to disturb the state's choice of 
method. 
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c. The Statefs Valuation 
Ordinarily, the court's conclusion in part I-B that the 
state's valuation methods are reasonable and acceptable would end 
the dispute. The railroads could appeal any alleged error in 
applying the state's methods to the state tax commission. Once 
the tax commission (and the state courts if necessary) had 
corrected any errors in applying the method, this court could 
then simply plug the state's final valuation figure into the 
equation and determine whether the 4R Act had been violated. 
However, because the state in this case relies on appraisals that 
were newly prepared for this proceeding, the plaintiffs have not 
had a chance to challenge the application of the state's chosen 
methods before the tax commission. Therefore, the court will 
consider the plaintiffs' xaajor claims of error in the state's 
application of its methods. 
The plaintiffs first claim the state erred in applying its 
direct capitalization method under its income approach. The 
state's direct capitalization rates or earnings-price ratios are 
not simply the E/Ps for the subject companies but are composites 
for the railroad industry derived from comparing the E/Ps and 
other financial data of a number of railroads. Everyone agrees 
that, to be useful, the companies compared must in fact be 
comparable to the subject railroad. The parties dispute which 
other railroads are truly comparable to UP and D&RG. The 
plaintiffs claim that there are no true comparables. That is 
46 
just another way of arguing that the state should not have used a 
direct capitalization approach in valuing the railroads* For the 
reasons discussed in part I-B, the court concludes that the 
state's approach is acceptable. There may be no perfect 
comparable, but the evidence suggests that that fact does not 
prevent appraisers and other analysts from comparing railroads 
and valuing them based on their comparisons. The statefs 
approach has an advantage over Mr. Goodwin's and Dr. Ifflander's 
in that it at least tries to select the most comparable companies 
and eliminates the so-called outliers. The state has offered 
plausible reasons for its choice of comparables. Moreover, at 
least in the case of the UP for assessment year 1984, the 
state's choice coincides with those companies Mr. Voytko, the 
plaintiffs' witness, said he considered the most comparable. 
Compare Tr. at 1655-61 (Mr. Voytko's testimony), with common ex. 
32 at S/2. In the ultimate analysis, the choice of comparables 
is a judgment call by the particular appraiser. This court 
cannot say that the railroads the state chose are not comparable 
or even that they are not the most comparable. It therefore 
declines to disturb the state's choices. 
The plaintiffs next argue that the state erred by applying 
its E/P ratios to the wrong earnings figure. It claims that the 
state has created a mismatch by using a current E/P and applying 
it to projected earnings. The court concludes that the mismatch, 
if any, is insignificant. 
The state bases its E/Ps on Value Line's so-called trailing 
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P/Es, which in turn relate a current price to the last twelve 
months' earnings. See Tr. at 956; defs' ex. 28 at B/2. Thus, 
trailing P/Es are based on historical data.43 The state applies 
this trailing ratio to an earnings figure that, although a 
projection, is also based on historical data.44 Although the two 
historical periods do not correspond completely, because the 
state weights the earnings figures to arrive at its five-year 
average, the earnings for the last twelve months receive the 
43
 Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, on the other hand, use 
Value Line's "straddle" P/Es. The straddle P/E is based on the 
last one or two quarters' actual earnings and two or three 
quarters of projected earnings. The court believes that the use 
of trailing ratios produces a more objective and hence better 
result. 
4 4
 The state's projections, like Dr. Schoenwald•s, are 
backwards looking in that they project future income based on 
past performance. The primary difference between the two is that 
the state weights previous years' NROI so as to put greater 
emphasis on more recent history. 
The state also adjusts previous years1 figures for inflation 
so that all the figures are in current dollers. The plaintiffs 
argue that such an adjustment is improper absent any evidence 
that inflation actually benefits rail assets, and, they claim, it 
does not. However, the state's inflation adjustment is not meant 
to indicate the effect of inflation on the assets but merely to 
enable the appraiser to look at history in terms of constant 
dollars. It may be, as Dr. Schoenwald suggests, that any 
adjustment for inflation is improper since the question is not 
buying power but actual, normalized earnings. The court cannot 
say from the evidence, however, that inflation has no positive 
effect on rail transportation property, and any error in the 
state's adjustment is partially offset by its weighting process, 
in which revenues from the oldest years (those most influenced by 
inflation) receive the least weight. Had the state based its 
projections on a straight five-year average, as Dr. Schoenwald 
did, instead of a weighted five-year average adjusted for 
inflation, its income figures would have been higher, resulting 
in higher overall values. Thus, any error in the state's use of 
an inflation factor is more than offset by its allegedly improper 
use of a weighted average. 
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greatest weight. Because those earnings relate directly to the 
trailing ratio, there is a match, though perhaps an imperfect 
match. The price is at least roughly matched to the earnings 
that produced it. 
The state's approach tries to establish a relationship 
between price and earnings based on so-called normalized data, 
that is, data that reflects historical trends, at the same time 
minimizing the effect of anomalous data. It does this by a five-
year weighted average of earnings and by using an E/P derived 
from the industry and not merely from the subject railroad. It 
is, in effect, not the E/P for any one railroad but for a 
hypothetical, composite railroad. The court does not believe 
that Dr. Schoenwald's proposed alternatives would necessarily 
produce a better result. For example, to increase the E/P, as 
Dr. Schoenwald does, see, e.g.. pltffs' ex. 475, based on a 
projected "ircrease" in earnings (which is really just a 
normalized earning figure) in effect begs the question by 
assuming what effect such an increase in earnings will have on 
price (namely, none). Similarly, to apply the trailing E/P to 
actual earnings for the year, as Dr. Schoenwald also does, see, 
e.g.. pltffs1 ex. 476, does not establish the relationship 
between price and projected income and may produce a skewed 
result if the earnings for that particular year were atypical for 
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any reason, for example, because of unusual capital expenditures 
undertaken during the year.45 
The plaintiffs next argue that the state appraisals err in 
their treatment of intracompany debt in the stock-and-debt 
approach because the stock market does not look at intracompany 
debt in valuing a company. However, Mr. Prawitt testified that 
he prepared his stock-and-debt analysis based on the railroad's 
balance sheet and that debts among the railroad and affiliated 
entities in effect offset each other on the balance sheet. The 
court believes there was nothing improper about the state's 
treatment of intracompany debt. 
The court has considered the plaintiffs1 other criticisms of 
the state appraisals and has rejected them.46 In short, the 
court accepts the state appraisals prepared by Mr. Prawitt as the 
best evidence of the plaintiffs' true market value as of the 
assessment dates. 
45 rphg plaintiffs might argue that if the earnings for the 
year were atypical, the price-earnings ratio should also be 
atypical and applying the actual P/E to the actual earnings will 
still produce a correct result. However, the E/P that the state 
applies is not the E/P for any particular company but supposedly 
an E/P for the industry. An atypical year for one railroad may 
not have much effect on the industry E/P, and applying that E/P 
to abnormal earnings may produce an abnormal result. 
4 6
 The court's conclusion is not meant in any way to 
preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the state's application 
of its chosen methodology for other assessment years, through 
the appropriate state procedures. 
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D. Conclusions 
The court holds that, for purposes of applying the 4R Act 
to the state's assessments of the plaintiff railroads, the true 
market value of the plaintiffs for the assessment years in 
question was as follows: 
1984 1985 
UP $3.7 billion $3.4 billion 
D&RG $320 million $320 million 
The court finds that the portion of the railroads1 true 
market value that should be allocated to Utah for the assessment 
years is as follows:47 
1984 1985 
UP 4.99% 4.97% 
D&RG 28.39% 26.81% 
Thus, the true market valve of the railroads1 rail 
transportation property in Utah for the assessment years was: 
1984 1985 
UP $184,630,000 $168,980,000 
D&RG $90,848,000 $85,760,000 
4 7
 The parties basically agree on these percentages. The 
figures are conveniently summarized in Plaintiffs1 Supplemented 
and Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
55 13, 15, 19 (UP for 1984); 20, 22, 25 (UP for 1985); 27, 29, 32 
(D&RG for 1984); 33, 35, 38 (D&RG for 1985). 
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The assessed value of the plaintiffs1 rail transportation 
property in Utah was as follows:48 
1984 1985 
UP $35,928,000 $39,760,000 
L'RG $19,305,200 $20,048,565 
Thus, the ratio of assessed value to true market value was 
as follows: 
1984 1985 
UP 19.46% 23.53% 
D&RG 21.25% 23.38% 
III. 
THE PLAINTIFFS1 EQUALIZATION CLAIMS 
The court's conclusions in part II -D of this opinion give 
the left half of the equation required by the 4R Act, namely, 
the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail 
transportation property within the state. See supra note 3. The 
parties have stipulated to the right half of the equation, 
namely, the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all 
other commercial and industrial property in the state. The 
stipulation presents the court with two scenarios, depending on 
whether or not the court upholds a state statutory scheme that 
4 8
 See pltffs1 exs. 391 at 4; 392 at 2; 394 at 2; and 396 
at 2. 
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discounts the assessed value of real property in the state an 
additional twenty percent.49 
Section 59-5-4.5 of the Utah Code stated: 
When the county asses[s]or uses the comparable sales or 
cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property for 
assessment purposes, the assessor is required to 
recognize that various fees, services, closing costs, 
and other expenses related to the transaction lessen 
the actual amount that may be received in the 
transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore, 
take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or cost 
appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair cash 
value for purposes of assessment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986).50 
Two county assessors testified that local assessments of 
commercial and industrial real property are generally based on 
49 ip^ stipulation also resolves by agreement the question 
of what constitutes "all other commercial and industrial 
property" in Utah for purposes of the 4R Act. The stipulation 
specifies four categories of other commercial and industrial 
properties—certain mining and oil and gas properties, utilities, 
locally assessed personal property and locally assessed real 
property. The parties have agreed on the true market value and 
assessment rates for three of the four categories. See pltffs1 
exs. 496 & 497. The only dispute is over the true market value 
and assessment rate for locally assessed real property, and the 
only disagreement between the parties there is whether or not 
the court should apply the 20 percent discount statute in 
determining true market value. 
5 0
 A revised version of the statute was enacted in 1987 and 
is codified at section 59-2-304 of the Utah Code. 
The statute further required the State Tax Commission to 
"develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods 
in valuing taxable property" that exclude "the various fees, 
services, closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales 
transaction and other intangible values." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
4.5(2) (Supp. 1986). The timetable for the State Tax Commission 
to develop and implement such methods has been pushed back to 
January 1, 1990. See id. § 59-2-304(2) (Supp. 1988). County 
assessors are required to use the methods the State Tax 
Commission develops for assessments beginning January 1, 1990. 
Id. 
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the cost appraisal method. £ge Tr. at 2344, 2351, 2374.51 The 
defendants therefore argue that, for purposes of the 4R Act, the 
true market value of locally assessed commercial and industrial 
property should be 80 percent of the appraised value, as required 
by the statute. 
The state's intent in passing the discount statute appears 
to have been to tax real property owners only on what they might 
expect to receive from a sale of their property and not on a 
hypothetical gross sales price.52 That intent may be admirable. 
5 1
 The assessors also testified that, of the three 
approaches commonly used, namely, the cost, income and market 
comparable approaches to value, the cost approach generally 
results in the highest values. See Tr. at 2343-44, 2374. The 
intervenors suggest that the discount statute simply brings the 
assessed values of locally assessed real property more in line 
with the values of state assessed properties, which give more 
weight to the income approach—in other words, that one should 
discount cost indicators of value by 20 percent to get a value 
that is comparable to values based on an income indicator. A 
similar argument was rejected in Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
Company v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 498 F. Supp. 418, 421 (M.D. 
La. 1980). This court similarly finds the argument unpersuasive. 
It also ignores the evidence. The evidence showed that Mr. 
Prawitt gives some weight to the cost indicator of value for the 
railroads. Moreover, Mr. Bexell, the Weber County Assessor, 
testified that the cost approach for real property results in 
values about 20 percent less than those determined under sales 
assessment ratio studies, the statutorily authorized method of 
valuing other commercial and industrial property under the 4R 
Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 306(2)(e), 90 Stat, at 55. Yet 
the state still reduces the values determined under the cost 
approach by 20 percent. 
5 2
 The legislative history of the statute suggests that the 
act may also have been meant to reduce the relative burden on 
locally assessed taxpayers that "arose out of [a] statewide 
reappraisal program, which had the effect of immediately 
injecting a high degree of inflation into residential values." 
Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184, 193 (Utah 
1984). The legislature apparently felt that the reappraisal 
program placed an unfair burden on locally assessed properties 
because "the formulae used to assess state-assessed properties 
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Moreover, the statute may pass constitutional muster.53 
Nevertheless, the court concludes that applying the statute to 
determine assessment ratios under the 4R Act discriminates 
against the railroads by artificially increasing the ratio for 
other commercial and industrial property. 
The 4R Act requires a comparison between two ratios, and, 
as all the experts in this case agreed, for comparisons to be 
valid the items compared must be comparable. That which is 
compared under the 4R Act is "true market value." Although the 
statute does not define "true market value," the experts all 
basically agreed that true market value (or its various synonyms) 
is the price that a willing and knowledgeable seller and a 
willing and knowledgeable buyer would agree on in an arm's length 
transaction. See, e.g.. Tr. at 12 (Dr. Schoenwald's definition 
of fair market value). The fact that the seller might not net 
did not tend to factor the effects of inflation into the state-
assessed properties, or if they did, they did so at a much more 
modest and less abrupt pace." Id. The evidence in this case 
makes the legislature's assumptions suspect. Dr. Schoenwald 
testified that the state's appraisal methods do factor in the 
effects of inflation, and, if they do so at a much more modest 
pace, it may be because inflation affects the value of rail 
assets less dramatically than it affects the value of real 
property. In trying to adjust taxpayers' relative burdens, the 
legislature would do well to bear in mind Sir Hermann Black's 
warning: "Oh what a tangled web we weave when [first] we 
practice to relieve." "Sayings of the Week," Sydney Morning 
Herald. July 6, 1985, quoted in A Dictionary of Legal Quotations 
163 (S. James & C. Stebbings comp. 1987). 
5 3
 In the Rio Algom case, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that section 59-5-4.5 did not violate 
article XIII of the Utah Constitution or the equal protection 
provisions of either the state or federal constitutions. See 681 
P.2d at 194. 
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the sale price does not mean that that price is not true market 
value.54 
The evidence in this case was that the figures arrived at 
using the comparable sales and cost appraisal methods of 
valuation—before applying any discount—are considered true 
market value. See, e.g.. Tr. at 2302 (testimony of Max Arnold), 
2361-62 (testimony of Steven C. Bexell); common ex. 11 (Utah 
State Tax Commission Assessment Sales Ratio Study for 1984) at 2 
(referring to the undiscounted values as "fair market value11).55 
In arriving at the railroads1 true market value, the state relies 
in part on a cost appraisal method, yet it does not reduce its 
final cost indicator of value by 20 percent. Similarly, its 
stock-and-debt approach is a form of comparable sales appraisal 
method, yet the state does not reduce its stock-and-debt 
indicator of value by 20 percent, nor does it deduct so-called 
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, in arriving at 
its final stock-and-debt indicator of value. Thus, if the court 
is to compare true market value to true market value, it should 
compare values before any adjustments for transaction costs or 
other so-called intangibles are made. 
In short, the court concludes that, for purposes of the 4R 
54
 Indeed, the parties would generally consider the 
transaction costs associated with the sale in arriving at true 
market value. 
5 5
 The parties1 stipulation itself indicates that the "true 
market value" of locally assessed real property is the value 
determined by the assessment sales ratio study before the 20 
percent reduction is applied. See Settlement Stipulation, § 
D(3)(b)(v). 
56 
Act, the true market value of "all other commercial and 
industrial property" in the state of Utah must be determined 
before the 20 percent discount statute is applied. Cf. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co, v. Department of Revenue. 736 
F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (an across-the-board reduction in 
assessed values of commercial and industrial properties under a 
state statute authorizing reductions in values to reflect costs 
of sale constituted discrimination in violation of the 4R Act 
because it "handfed] non-selling local property owners a windfall 
. . . that was not bestowed on railroads").56 This does not mean 
that the state cannot continue to give the 20 percent discount to 
locally assessed real property. It simply means that, in 
determining whether the state's assessments of railroads 
discriminates against the railroads in violation of the 4R Act, 
the court must consider the value of locally assessed real 
property before the statutory discount is applied. The state may 
still be free to choose to tax real property on the basis of the 
net amount the property owner could expect to receive from a sale 
of his property. But that net amount is not "true market value" 
as that term is used by appraisers and in the 4R Act. 
Based on the stipulation of the parties, the court finds 
that the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all 
5 6
 The Eleventh Circuit left open the question of whether 
the state would violate the 4R Act if, in determining the just 
value of commercial and industrial property it deducted the 
actual costs of sale for those properties that actually sold 
during the year. 
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other commercial and industrial property within the state for 
assessment year 1984 was 15.4 percent and for assessment year 
1985 was 16.13 percent. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the court1s conclusions in part II-D and part III 
of this opinion, it is clear that the state of Utah has 
discriminated against the plaintiff railroads in its tax 
assessments of the plaintiffs for the years 1984 and 1985 in that 
it has assessed them at a higher rate than it assessed all other 
commercial and industrial property within the state for the same 
period. However, the 4R Act only authorizes relief if the ratio 
of assessed value to true market value for rail transportation 
property exceeds the ratio for all other commercial and 
industrial property "by at least 5 per centum.ff Pub. L. No. 94-
210 § 306(2)(c), 90 Stat, at 54. The court must therefore 
compare the various assessment ratios for each of the plaintiffs 
and for "all other commercial and industrial property" in the 
state for each assessment year to determine whether the 
plaintiffs are entitled to relief. The percentage by which UP 
and the D&RG were overvalued for each of the assessment years is 
as follows: 
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1984 1985 
UP 26% 46% 
D&RG 38% 45% 
Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the 4R 
Act.57 
The defendants are hereby ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs 
as follows: For assessment year 1984, the defendants are ORDERED 
to assess the plaintiffs based on an assessed value that is 15.4 
percent of their true market value as determined by the court or 
stipulated to by the parties. For assessment year 1985, the 
defendants are ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs based on an 
assessed value that is 16.13 percent of their true market value 
as determined by the court or stipulated to by the parties. The 
defendants are hereby ENJOINED from collecting property taxes 
from the plaintiffs for assessment years 1984 and 1985 based on 
assessed values that bear a greatei ratio to true market value 
than 15.4 percent and 16.13 percent respectively. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 1^ day of December, 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
5 7
 The state concedes that, if UP and D&RG are entitled to 
equalization relief under the 4R Act, SP is entitled to relief 
as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison of Appraisals?-
UNION PACIFIC 
1984 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 
Obsolescence 
Schoenwald 
(ex. C-30) 
5,555,803 
(2,815,681) 
State 
(ex. C-32) 
6,205,607 
(1,828,350) 
Goodwin & 
Ifflander 
(ex. C-31^ 
6,200,299 
(1,942,554) 
Cost indicator 2,740,122 4,377,259 4,257,746 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capita] ized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating 
leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NRDI + net 
lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
338,643 
15.40% 
2,198,981 
320,000 
9.77% 
3,2'5,333 
81,972 
92,118 
3,449,423 
356,910 
8.90% 
4,010,229 
4,010,229 
N/A 
15.11% 
4,577,513 
1
 All dollars are expressed in thousands. Final indicators may vary 
slightly from column totals due to rounding. 
stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 
R.R. long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & 
liabilities 
R.R. value 
Allocation factor (applied only 
to stock value by G&I) 
Market value, R.R. operating 
property 
Leased equipment 
Stock and debt indicator 
3,074,843 
1,491,073 
(115,622) 
4,450,294 
83.98% 
3,737,350 
106,017 
3,843,367 
3,000,000 
1,414,415 
4,414,415 
89.39% 
4,096,115 
34,246 
4,130,361 
Total value, parent's stock & 10,549,892 
debt 
Total value, non-railroad & nan- (7,531,760) 
operating property 
Stock and debt indicator 3,018,132 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 
2,740,122 
2,198,981 
3,018,132 
4,377,259 
3,449,423 
3,843,367 
4,257,746 
4,010,229 
4,577,513 
4,130,361 
Correlated market value 2,608,557 3,700,000 4,100,000 
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UNICN PACIFIC 
1985 
Goodwin & 
Schoenwald State Ifflander 
(ex. 0-33) (ex. C-351 (ex. 0-34) 
Cost Approadi 
Net book value 5,671,608 6,475,611 6,467,163 
Obsolescence (3,187,444) (2,076,376) (2,661,884) 
liabilities 
Cost indicator 2,484,164 4,399,234 3,805,279 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capitalized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating 
leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NRDI + net 
lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Inccxne indicator (yield cap) 1,942,594 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 2,674,843 2,600,000 
R.R. long-term debt 1,427,374 1,322,267 
R.R. net current assets & 32,454 
310,815 
16.00% 
310,000 
11.98% 
2,587,646 
85,752 
87,113 
2,760,511 
366,887 
10.30% 
3,562,010 
3,562,010 
R.R. value 4,134,671 3,922,267 
Allocation factor (applied only 81.77% 86.69% 
to stock value by G&I) 
Market value, R.R. operating 3,380,866 3,567,207 
property 
Leased equipment 93,256 28,640 
Stock and debt indicator 3,474,122 3,604,847 
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Total value, parent's stock & 8,881,003 
debt 
Total value, non-railroad & non- (6,290,824) 
operating property 
Stock and debt indicator 2,590,179 
Oorrelated Values 
Cost indicator 2,484,164 4,399,234 3,805,279 
Incxme indicator (direct cap) 2,760,511 3,562,011 
Income indicator (yield cap) 1,942,594 
Stock and debt indicator 2,590,179 3,474,122 3,604,847 
Oorrelated market value 2,266,387 3,400,000 3,600,000 
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EENVER & RIO GRANDE 
1984 
Goodwin & 
Schoenwald State Ifflander 
(ex. C-36) fex. C-38) (ex. C-37) 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 467,739 541,000 537,697 
Obsolescence (286,022) (197,962) (207,282) 
Cost indicator 181,717 343,039 330,415 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 
Capitalized value of income 
Construction in progress 
Capitalized value, operating 
leases 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Income estimate (NROI + net 
lease rentals) 
Capitalization rate (yield cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 163,526 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 
R.R. long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & 
liabilities 
R.R. value 432,632 375,757 
Allocation factor (applied only 81.87% 89.43% 
25,183 
15.40% 
23,000 
8.28% 
277,778 
8,163 
5,954 
291,894 
25,851 
8.30% 
311,453 
311,453 
350,000 
87,657 
(5,025) 
300,000 
75,757 
to stock value by G&I) 
Market value, R.R. operating 354,187 344,047 
property 
Teased equipment 8,946 6,771 
Stock and debt indicator 363,133 350,817 
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Itatal value, parents stock & 
debt 
Total value, non-railroad & non-
cperating property 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Income indicator (direct cap) 
Inocroe indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 
Correlated market value 
677,366 
(331,531) 
345,835 
181,717 343,039 330,415 
291,894 311,453 
163,526 
345,835 363,133 350,817 
254,681 320,000 330,000 
DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
1985 
Goodwin & 
Schoenwald State Ifflander 
(ex, C-39) (eye. 0-41) (ex. 0-40) 
Cost Approach 
Net book value 598,509 585,883 
Obsolescence (159f082) (198,380) 
Cost indicator 439,428 387,503 
Income Approach 
Income estimate 27,000 30,727 
Capitalization rate (direct cap) 11.00% 10.10% 
Capitalized value of inccme 245,455 304,232 
Construction in progress 1,582 
Capitalized value, operating 5,038 
leaf 
Inccroe indicator (direct cap) 252,075 304,232 
Inccroe estimate (NRDI + net 
lease rentals) 
Capital izaticxi rate (yield cap) 
Inccroe indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and Debt Approach 
Market value, R.R. stock 
R.R. long-term debt 
R.R. net current assets & 
liabilities 
R.R. value 
Allocation factor (applied only 
to stock value by G&I) 
Market value, R.R. operating 
property 
Leased equipment 
Stock and debt indicator 394,910 346,892 
350,000 
79,394 
13,999 
443,393 
87.67% 
388,729 
6,181 
275,000 
82,405 
357,405 
93.22% 
338,760 
8,132 
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Total value, parent's stock & 491,129 
debt 
Total value, non-railroad & non- (212,393) 
operating property 
Stock and debt indicator 278,736 
Correlated Values 
Cost indicator 
Incone indicator (direct cap) 
Income indicator (yield cap) 
Stock and debt indicator 278,736 
439,428 
252,075 
394,910 
387,503 
304,232 
346,892 
Correlated market value 278,7362 320,000 325,000 
2
 Dr. Schoenwald's appraisal of D&BG for assessment year 1985 is based 
solely on his analysis of the purchase of Rio Grande Industries, Inc., by the 
Anschutz Corporation in the fall of 1984. 
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